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INTRODUCTION

When hazards in the workplace threaten the health of fetuses carried
by female workers, an employer has two options. It can comply with state
tort law, or it can comply with federal anti-discrimination law. The
quandary that employers face in the wake of the Supreme Court's
decision in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc. 1 is that
they cannot comply with both laws at once.
In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court struck down a fetal
protection policy that excluded all fertile women from working in a
battery manufacturing plant.2 Despite fetal hazards posed by airborne
lead in the plant, the Court concluded that Johnson Controls' policy
discriminated against women in violation of federal law.3 The Court held
that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 particularly the 1978
amendment to that title known as the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"),5 preserves the employee's autonomy to decide for herself
whether she wishes to work in a hazardous environment, regardless of the
employer's concern about fetal health.6
In striking down Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy, the
Supreme Court essentially ruled that the worker's interest in employment
and autonomy7 takes precedence over the countervailing interest offered
s. Ct. 1196 (1991).

I

111

1

!d. at 1209-10. All references in this Article to "fetal protection policies" denote gender-

specific policies that exclude women, but not men, based on the women•s potential to become
pregnant.
3
Jd. at 1199-208.
• Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (1981)).
s Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42
u.s.c. § 2000e(k) (1981)).
• 111 S. Ct. at 1207. The essence of the PDA in this regard is that, for purposes of Title VII,
forbidden sex discrimination is defined to include discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
related conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981). Under the PDA, then, a woman capable of
performing a particular job cannot be excluded from that job on the ground that she is pregnant or
capable of becoming pregnant, any more than she can be excluded based on her sex per se.
7
Professor Kim Dayton has argued that
[b]y framing the fetal protection issue as one of conflicting rights-between the mother and
the fetus-advocates of the concept of fetal protection successfully have created an
analytical framework that invites a resolution of the alleged conflict in favor of fetal
protection, even if that means denying the mother job opportunities or even her freedom.
Kim Dayton, Patriarchy, Paternalism and the Masks of "Fetal Protection," 2 KAN. J.L. & PuB.
PoL•Y 25, 28 (1992) (citing Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation
ofPregnancy, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 1325, 1335 (1990)). Fertile women who are excluded from jobs
under a policy as broad as the one in Johnson Controls may have absolutely no intention of
becoming pregnant, and consequently, may be unconcerned about fetal hazards. Even those women
who intend to procreate or who are already pregnant may find that it is in the family's best interest
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by Johnson Controls in defense of its policy-the well-being of future
generations.8 The question that remains open is whether the dominance of the
worker's interest is absolute, regardless of what particular interest inspires the
employer to exclude women, or whether interests other than those relied
upon in Johnson Controls may sometimes override the interest of the
employee. If such overriding is possible, then fetal protection plans are
defensible under appropriate circumstances, even though the Johnson Controls
case established that the employer's narrow, altruistic interest in the welfare
of future generations cannot support such a defense.9 If such overriding is not
possible, then employers must include eligible women in their workforce,
regardless of what ramifications the hazards present may threaten.10

to take extra precautions and remain in the higher-paying, albeit riskier, position rather than to accept
a safer position at a pay level insufficient to provide for their families.
To the extent that fetal protection policies focus on women's reproductive capacities to the
exclusion of their work capacities, such policies arguably relegate women to the "one-dimensional"
role of''vessel and nurturer for the next generation" which Title VII was intended to correct. Wendy
W. Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation ofFetal Protection with
Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 653 (1981).
1
See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., con~urring); Maria A. Longi,
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Can Science Ever Justify Gender Discrimination?, 19 N. KY. L. REv. 425, 445-46 (1992) (discussing the assignment of responsibility for fetal
protection in the workplace). Johnson Controls offered no rationale for its policy other than the
altruistic interest in the health of future generations. See infra note 18. Despite the professed concern
for the well-being of future generations, commentators suggest that employers' true motivation in
adopting fetal protection policies is to keep women either out of the workplace or in the lowerranking, lower-paying jobs that women have traditionally occupied. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, From
Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 1219, 1240 (1986). The fact
that employers also tend not to be concerned about the fetal hazards in other occupations, such as
nursing and secretarial work, that have traditionally employed women anyway, while expressing
concern for hazards to fetuses of women holding traditionally male-occupied positions, suggests to
many that impermissible bias is at work See id. at 1237-41 (concluding that employers tend to
exclude all fertile women from hazardous jobs where the work force is predominantly male, but only
pregnant women where the work force is predominantly female); Williams, supra note 7, at 649
(finding that women are more likely to be excluded from male dominated jobs even though males
and females are both vulnerable to the toxins present); cf. Becker, supra, at 1225 (finding that state
protective legislation excluded women only from occupations in which they were deemed
unimportant); Hannah A. Furnish, Prenatal Exposure to Fetally Toxic Work Environments: The
Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to ntle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 66 IowA
L. REv. 63, 81 (1980) (recognizing that the legislative histozy ofPDA "is replete with documentation
of employer use of women's childbearing capacity as an excuse for not hiring women ••. despite the
illegality of such conduct under Title VII''). Such bias is also suggested by the fact that employers
tend to adopt fetal protection policies that exclude women because of certain toxins, but ignore
evidence that the same toxins harm male reproduction. See Williams, supra, at 655-61. In this
connection, it is noteworthy that Johnson Controls' battery-manufacturing employees consisted
exclusively of males before the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964. Johnson Controls, 111 S.
Ct. at 1199.
'Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
1
° Critics of the Johnson Controls decision consider it a threat to fetal well-being and to the
financial interests of businesses that will be liable in tort for fetal injuries. See Jerry J. Jasinowski,
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As a result of the Johnson Controls decision, employers are left

fearful of the no-win situation described above. An employer that chooses
to comply with the federal law announced in Johnson Controls by
admitting women to a hazardous workplace risks liability under state tort
law for fetal harm. 11 On the other hand, an employer that chooses to
avoid tort liability by excluding women from the workplace risks liability
under Title VII.
A third possibility is that some employers will never face the
envisioned quandary because the threat of tort liability simply will never
materialize. Any of several factors could eliminate the prospect of
employer tort liability for fetal harm. Employers may, for example, be
found to enjoy workers' compensation immunity for injuries sustained by
fetuses while the fetuses are "part of" employees who are themselves
constrained by workers' compensation innnunity.12 In the alternative,
employers may avoid tort liability by entering into contracts of indemnity
with female workers, or by using some other measure to ensure that the
women who elect to expose their fetuses to workplace hazards, and not
Protect Employers from Irrational Laws, USA ToDAY, Mar. 25, 1991, at A23 (criticizing Johnson
Controls as subjecting employers to inational requirements); Lawrence Postol & Mary Adelman,
Protecting Progeny and Pockerbooks, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1991, at 37 (discussing alternatives
available to businesses in the wake of Johnson Controls, such as moving their operations to other
countries, and noting the threat to fetuses); see also Bamara R. Gnunet, Fertile Women May Now
Apply: Fetal Protection Policies After Johnson Controls, 2 RisK: IssuES HEALTii & SAFETY 261
(1991) (discussing options available to respond to fetal injury).
11
Disagreement exists regarding the existence of a fetal tort liability threaL Compare Johnson
Controls, 111 S. CL at 1208 (arguing that employers ~hould not be liable for fetal hann absent
employer negligence) with id. at 1210-11 (White, J., concuning) (arguing that employers may be held
liable in strict liability). All states presently recognize that children bom alive have a tort cause of
action against third parties for prenatal injuries. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concuning) (citing W. PAGE
KEEToN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984)); see
Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1371, 1372-73 (W.O. Va. 1975) (holding that the Virginia Supreme
Court would allow a tort action by a child who has suffered prenatal injuries in light of the fact that
almost all American jurisdictions faced with the issue have pennitted such suits), cited in Junius C.
McElveen, Reproductive Hazards in the Workplace, 20 FORUM 547, 563 (1985). Some jurisdictions
also recognize a cause of action for pre-conception torts. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211
(White, 1., concuning) (citing 3 FOWLER V.liARPER ET AL., LAw OF TORTS § 18.3, at 677-78 n.15
(2d ed. 1986)); see also James W. Brown, Comment, UAW v. Johnson Controls: Gender
Discrimination in the Fetotoxic Workplace, 44 RuroERS L. REv. 479, 520 (1992} (recognizing the
reality of the risk of fetal tort claims being brought against companies like Johnson Controls). But
cf. Catherwood v. American Sterilizer Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (1986) (refusing to recognize a
cause of action for chromosomal damage occuning prior to child's conception), affd, 511 N.Y.S.2d
807 (1987).
1
z But see Cushing v. Time Saver Stores, Inc., 552 So. 2d 730 (La. CLApp. 1989) (finding that
worlcers' compensation immunity against the mother's claims did not bar a child's claim for prenatal
injuries caused by an accident in the mother's workplace), cert. denied, 556 So. 2d 1281 (La. 1990).
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the employers, will foot the bill for resultant injuries.13 There is also the
possibility that employers will avoid the quandary as a result of the
enactment of federal or state legislation that some commentators have
advocated.14 Thus, despite the outcry of employers in the wake of
Johnson Controls, some employers may never confront the dilemma in
question.
Those employers that do confront the dilemma have two potential
escape routes. The employer that elects to comply with federal law will
invoke the doctrine of federal preemption as a defense to the fetal tort
suit. 15 This employer will argue that conflicts between the federal law
and the state law render the state law void. The employer that elects
instead to exclude women in apparent violation of Johnson Controls in
order to avoid catastrophic fetal tort liability will invoke the statutocy
bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense. 16 This employer
will argue that the prohibitive costs of tort liability render infertility an
essential qualification for female employees in the hazardous workplace.17 Although both of these escape routes elicited Supreme Court
commentary in Johnson Controls, neither was actually presented by the
facts of the case. 18 Thus, the Court's comments on both are arguably
dicta.
This Article analyzes the employer's prospects for escaping its fetal
injury quandary by means of either the BFOQ defense or federal
preemption. After a brief explanation of Title VII doctrine governing
employer fetal protection policies, the Article assesses the likelihood that
u See Postol & Adelman, supra note 10, at 37. Many employees, of course, would not have the
personal financial resources to cover such indemnification. The contract of indemnification would
selVe to caution such parents of the potential threats to fetuses that workplace toxins pose and would
selVe as a disincentive for women planning procreation to enter hazardous work environments. It
would also serve as a disincentive to parent-initiated lawsuits on behalf of the damaged offspring.
14
Some writers have advocated legislative action to ensure that employers that comply with
Johnson Controls will not be held liable in tort for fetal harm. See. e.g., Vindicating Women's Job
Rights, CHI. TRJB., March 24, 1991, § 4, at 2; Women Workers and 'Benign' Bias, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, March 25, 1991, at 20.
J$ See infra text accompanying notes 54-149 (discussing the federal preemption doctrine).
" The BFOQ provision of Title VII excuses discrimination if the employer discriminates "on
the basis of [the employee's] religion, sex or national origin in those certain instances where religion,
sex or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981); see also infra
text accompanying notes 150-215 (discussing the availability of BFOQ in fetal protection cases).
17
See infra text accompanying notes 150-215.
11
See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1207-10 (1991);
id. at 1210-14 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Johnson Controls, the
company's only argument was based on the quite narrow defense of the employer's own altruistic
interest in fetal health. See id. at 1207-08. Notably absent from the defendant's case were financial
justifications, such as avoidance of tort liability. !d. at 1209.
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either, or both, of these escape routes will be available to employers
confronted with the problem of fetal hazards in the workplace. 19 The
Article concludes that the BFOQ is, in theory, a more promising escape
mechanism than federal preemption. As a result, employers facing
ruinous tort liability may sometimes fare best by excluding women in
violation of Johnson Controls, and relying on the BFOQ defense.20 The
Article further concludes that any BFOQ predicated upon the potential
cost of fetal tort liability should be confmed to situations in which the
costs of such liability will be ruinous to the employer.
I.

JOHNSON CONTROLS

A. Historical Context and Analytical Methodology
The major debate in fetal protection cases prior to the Johnson
Controls decision centered on the issue of which Title VII analytical
methodology should govern cases challenging fetal protection plans. Title
VII provided courts with two methodologies to choose from: disparate
treatment (for intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (for neutral
practices or policies with statistically adverse effects on women as a
group).21 A court's choice of methodology was significant because, under
Title VII, the court's decision of whether to analyze the case as either
disparate treatment or disparate impact determined which defense an
employer could invoke.22 As explained below, the disparate impact
" This Article assumes that the employer under discussion has done all within its power to make
the worl<place safe and is involved in a business that simply cannot rid itself of fetal hazards. An
employer that has not taken available precautions certainly should not succeed in defending its
exclusion of women to protect their fetuses.
10
This conclusion would traditionally have been reinforced by the fact that fetal tort damages
are more likely to be of astronomical proportions than are Title VII damages. Under the 1991 Civil
Rights Act, however, the availability ofpunitive damages for intentional violations ofTitle VII means
that employers who knowingly violate Title VII. as construed in Johnson Controls, may face equally
large damages awards. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071,
1072-73 (1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C.S. § 198la(b) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
21
See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977)
(distinguishing between treatment and impact cases). For application of the two methodologies, see
McDonnell Douglas Co1.p. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973) (applying disparate treatment
analysis in a facial discrimination case) and Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971)
(applying disparate impact analysis when there is no proof of discriminatory pmpose).
In addition to forbidding employment discrimination based on sex, Title VII forbids
discrimination based on race, color, religion and national origin. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
Because this Article pertains to sex discrimination, it describes the operation of Title VII in terms
of sex.
22
See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment Discriminatian
Law Revisited: &me Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1359, 1395-403
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defendant could prevail by persuading the court that the practice was
warranted by "business necessity,"23 whereas the disparate treatment
defendant had to prove the elements of the more stringent BFOQ
defense.24
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls, employers
defending fetal protection plans advocated impact analysis because the
business necessity defense is broader and easier to prove than the BFOQ
defense.25 The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for example, describes the
employer's business necessity burden in impact analysis as that of
"demonstrat[ing] that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.''26 The more
stringent BFOQ defense, on the other hand, has been described as
requiring the defendant to demonstrate that the "essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex
exclusively." 27
(1990).
23

42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(l)(A)(i) (Supp. 1990). Unlike the BFOQ, which is a statutory defense,
the recently enacted business necessity defense was originally the product of Supreme Court decision.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (when neutral employer practices are
discriminatory in operation, the touchstone is business necessity).
2
' See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (holding that the BFOQ is the
only available defense in intentional discrimination cases); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981)
(providing for the BFOQ defense); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (1988) (construing BFOQ nanowly);
Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 Omo ST. L.J. 5, 11 (1991) (stating that the "BFOQ defense is,
of necessity, quite narrow[,] •.. established only when a sex-based distinction is necessary to actual
job perfonnance') (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334, 336 (1977), and International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 903 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 111 S. CL 1196 (1991)); see infra note 25. Professor Befort classifies "[t]he relatively few
[judicially recognized] BFOQs ••• into three categories: authenticity, privacy, and safety." Id. at 17.
The defense is further constricted by virtue ofits unavailability in cases alleging race discrimination.
See Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F. 2d 1305, 1308 (7th Cir. 1989). Under the tenns of Title Vll,
the BFOQ requires the defendant to persuade the court that the exclusion of women is ''reasonably
necessary to the nonnal operation of [the] particular business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1981),
quoted in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985).
2S See Wright v. Olin Coxp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982) {noting that employers
restricted to the BEOQ to defend fetal protection plans, rather than the business necessity defense,
would have no effective defense at all); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 491 (describing the
differences between business necessity and BFOQ). Such business reasons can be far broader than
the job perfonnance question under the BFOQ. See Befort, supra note 24, at 11; Mark S. Brodin,
Costs, Profits, and Equal Employment Opportunity, 62 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 318 (1987); cf. id. at
358 (advocating a narrowing of the business necessity defense by arguing that BFOQ and business
necessity defenses should be substantially similar).
u 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. 1990); see supra note 23.
n Diaz v. Pan Am. World Aitways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
(1971), quoted in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); see also Torres v. Wisconsin
Dep't of Health & Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that BFOQ must be
reasonably necessary to furthering an objective that is the essence of the business), cert. denied, 489
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Rather than choose between these two methodologies, courts prior to
Johnson Controls strained to combine the two approaches, creating a
hybrid analysis that tended to preserve the challenged fetal protection
measures.28 The hybrid analysis allowed employers to avoid the onerous
task of proving the elements of the BFOQ. Instead, employers had only
to demonstrate that fetal hazards were, indeed, transmitted by women and
not by men. The advantage that this gave to employers disappeared with
the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls.
B. Johnson Controls' Fetal Protection Policy
Johnson Controls manufactures batteries using a process that exposes
plant employees to lead.29 Because of that exposure and the reality that
many pregnancies are unplanned, the company adopted a fetal protection
policy that excluded all fertile women from portions of the plant in which
tests had revealed excessive lead levels.30 The company's fetal protection
policy applied to female applicants for positions and to any female
U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989); cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6(b) (1992) (explaining the
elements of BFOQ defense).
21
The two major opinions on the subject were Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543
(11th Cir. 1984) and Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
In Hayes, a hospital fired a pregnant x-ray technician to protect her fetus from radiation. 726
F.2d at 1546. Meshing impact and treatment analysis, the Hayes court pennitted the hospital to rebut
what the court tenned the "presumption that [an] ••. employer's policy which by its tenns applies
only to women or pregnant women is facially discriminatocy" by showing that the ''policy is neutral
in the sense that it effectively and equally protects the offspring of all employees." !d. at 1552. But
see infra note 44 (discussing the irony of this decision). Similarly, in Wright, the Fourth Circuit held
that the employer was entitled to assert the business necessity defense, rather than being required to
assert the BFOQ defense, in a suit challenging the employer's "fetal vulnerability'' program. 697 F.2d
at 1185-86 n.21. The hybrid analysis found acceptance at the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission [hereinafter EEOC], which patterned guidelines on the Wright-Hayes analysis, only to
have the guidelines dismantled when the Supreme Court decided Johnson Controls. See EEOC: IJ
Policy Guidance on Supreme Court's Johnson Controls Decision, 8 Lab. Rei. Rep. (BNA) 405:6941,
6943 (June 28, 1991).
~Lead forms a crucial component of batteries. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc., 680 F. Supp. 309, 310 (E.D. Wis. 1988), affd en bane, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
30
Johnsan Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1199-200. These levels corresponded to the Centers for
Disease Control's standards for children. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 876 n.7. The levels were
lower than OSHA employee exposure standards. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(c)(l), (k:XI)(i)(D) (1992);
886 F.2d at 871. Agreeing with the district court, the court of appeals found "overwhelming evidence
in [the} record establish[ing} that an unborn child's exposure to lead creates a substantial health risk
involving a danger of permanent harm." /d. at 883. See generally M. Chris Floyd, Case Note, Putting
the Teeth Back into the BFOQ Requirement of Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act:
International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 26 U. RICH. L. REv. 413, 427 (1992) (discussing
additional lead hazards). Johnson Controls' policy presumed that a woman was fertile unless she
could prove otherwise with medical documentation. 111 S. Ct. at 1200.
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employee who sought transfer to a lead-exposed position, regardless of
the intentions of the applicant or employee regarding procreation.31
C. The Lower Courts
A group of employees affected by this policy and a labor union brought
a class action in federal district court to challenge the policy as sex discrimination wtder Title Vll.32 Applying the hybrid impact/treatment analysis, the
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant.33 The hybrid
analysis required this result because there was substantial expert opinion
recognizing a significant risk to the unborn from maternal lead exposure
at the levels present in the defendant's workplace.34
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit accepted this hybrid analysis35 and
found in addition that the facts of the case also supported the BFOQ
defense.36 For BFOQ purposes, the appellate court found the essence of
31

Thus, Johnson Controls' policy was broad enough to exclude all fertile women, rather than
excluding only those women who were pregnant or planning pregnancies. The company's rationales
for the breadth of their policy were that lead could hann the fetus between conception and discovery
of the pregnancy, that reduction of blood lead levels once the pregnancy was detected could take a
significant period of time, and that pregnancies are frequently unplanned. 886 F.2d at 878, 882.
u Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. Union plaintiffs were the International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America [hereinafter UAW], and
several UAW local unions. 886 F.2d at 874.
31
Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. at 318.
,.. Id. at 315. The district court followed Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984), finding disparate impact analysis appropriate since the established threat of harm through
the mother effectively rebutted a presumption of facial discrimination. 680 F. Supp. at 316. Having
found the presumption rebutted, the court necessarily found that, under Hayes, the defendant had met
the requirements of the business neeessity defense. Jd. For a discussion of Hayes, see supra note 28.
15
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 884-86 (discussing and adOpting hybrid analysis). The appellate
court concluded that it was irrelevant whether a challenged fetal protection policy amounted to
intentional discrimination {thus calling for disparate treatment analysis) or merely resulted in a
disparate impact (thus calling for impact analysis). Id. at 886-87. In either event, the business
necessity defense would be available.
·
All of the dissenting judges argued that the case was strictly disparate treatment, and that the
only available defense was BFOQ. See id. at 902 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); id. at 904 (Posner, J.,
dissenting); id. at 909 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The dissenters differed, however, on the question
of whether the BFOQ might ever successfully defend a fetal protection case. Their disagreement
centered on the issue of whether an employer's goal of protecting fetuses can qualifY as the essence
ofthe employer's business, or whether the BFOQ is limited to considerations of the employee's ability
to perfonn the functions of the job, disregarding any effect on fetal health. Compare id. at 904
(Posner, J., dissenting) and id. at 901 {Cudahy, J., dissenting) with id. at 912 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting). The appellate court's BFOQ analysis was, in effect, an alternative rationale that would
support its holding even if the business necessity defense turned out to be unavailable in such cases.
!d. at 893.
u !d. at 893 {concluding that Johnson Controls' policy should be upheld as a BFOQ).
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Johnson Controls' business to include the safe manufacture ofbatteries.37
Thus, the goal of protecting fetuses was part of the essence of defendant's, and probably every, business.38 The Seventh Circuit also found
that Johnson Controls had demonstrated that the absolute exclusion of
fertile women was necessary to meet this essential fetal protection
goal.39

D. Supreme Court Resolution
The Supreme Court voted unanimously to permit women to decide
for themselves whether to risk the fetal hazards present in Johnson
Controls' battery plant.40 The Court first rejected the hybrid approach
that had permitted employers to rely on the business necessity
defense. 41 Instead, the Court concluded that fetal protection plans
7

Id. at 896. This decision represented a departure from traditional BFOQ doctrine, which tended
to limit the defense to matters pertaining to the worker's ability to perform the job. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977).
11
Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 896-97; see supra note 27 and accompanying text (explaining
BFOQ essence requirement). This conclusion highlights a point of contention with respect to
"business essence." How many "essences" can a business have? If the "essence" of Johnson Controls'
business is not just battery manufacture, but battery manufacture without damage to the unborn, then
what other goals might .also be deemed the "essence" of the business? Can we, for example, include
in the essence of a company's business the goals of not banning the environment, of not adding to
unemployment in times of national economic recession, of not inflaming international relations in
volatile situations, and of earning enough money to stay in business? Or, is essence simply the part
of the business activities or production that causes people to tum their money over to the business?
"Id. at 897-99. The court explained that women could not be permitted to ''brush off"
environmental threats to the fetus the way they could ignore similar threats to their own health. The
court found support in the fact that the law sometimes forbids parents from refusing blood
transfusions for their children, even though the parents would be permitted to refuse such treatment
for themselves. Id. at 897. In addition, the court recognized that society is legitimately concerned with
risks to unborn children because society may ultimately be responsible for meeting the special needs
of children damaged by lead. I d. It is odd that the court found support for distinguishing between the
right to harm one's self and the absence of a right to harm one's fetus in the fact that society may be
burdened with the costs of damage to the fetus. Society so frequently ends up paying for damage that
adults inflict on themselves, as well.
.a Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199, 1210. Shortly after the Supreme Court struck down
Johnson Controls' policy, women began to apply for the jobs involving lead exposure from which
the policy had excluded them. See Florence Estes, Supreme Friends: The Stars of the Fetal Case
Stood Their Ground-Together, CHI. Trus., Apr. 28, 1991, § 6, at 3. Supporters of the Johnson
Controls decision term it "a resounding victoty for women's and workers' rights." Floyd, supra note
30, at 413 (quoting Katy L. Moss, A Victory for Choice, 13 NAT'L L.J., April 8, 1991, at 13).
Whether for or against the decision, commentators tend to view the case as having cleared the path
to the major undertaking of making the workplace safe for all workers, regardless of sex, and free
of hazards that could harm the offspring of workers whether through fathers or mothers. See Ellen
Goodman, Equal But Not Saft, BosroN GLOBE, Mar. 24, 1991, at A23; Ruth Rosen, What Feminist
Victory in the Court?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1991, at A17.
•• Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1203.
)
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constitute intentional, overt, sex discrimination that calls for disparate
treatment, not disparate impact, analysis.42 The Court explained that
such plans' open exclusion of women and not men43 renders the plans
antithetical to disparate impact, which seeks to remedy discriminatory
effects of facially neutral practices.44
Because it was subject to the disparate treatment approach,
Johnson Controls' plan could survive challenge only if Johnson
Controls could establish the BFOQ defense. Inasmuch as Johnson
Controls had not shown that infertility constituted a BFOQ for all
female employees, the Court concluded that Johnson Controls had
failed to prove the only defense available.4s Having agreed on these
two particulars, however, the justices parted company.
2

/d. at 1202-04. The Court based its characterization of the discrimination as intentional and
overt on the fact that under Johnson Controls' policy, "[f]ertile men, but not fertile women, were
given a choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a particular job." /d. at
1202. In the Title VII context, to say the employer intentionally discriminates means simply that the
employer makes an employment decision based on the sex of the plaintiff. The employer's action
need not be motivated by any malice toward the plaintiff or toward women generally, but only by
the simple fact of the plaintiffs sex. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987).
As discussed supra note 6, discrimination based on an employee's ability to become pregnant is the
same thing as discrimination based on sex.
'' Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1202-04 (analyzing fetal protection plans under disparate
treatment analysis because such plans amount to facial discrimination). Even without the PDA,
traditional Title VII doctrine would suggest that fetal protection policies are facially discriminatory.
The Supreme Court has established that employers that exclude only a subset of women, rather than
all women, are nevertheless guilty of discrimination. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Co1p., 400 U.S. 542,
544 (1971) (holding that a policy of hiring men, but not women, with preschool-age children violates
Title VII). As long as a policy excludes fertile women, and not fertile men, then the policy constitutes
overt sex discrimination. The enactment of the PDA simply confinns that such policies discriminate
on their face. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1981).
" Because fetal protection measures constitute facial discrimination, and thus clearly are subject
to disparate treatment analysis, the ruling in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 P.2d 1543 (11th
Cir. 1984), was particularly ironic. See supra note 28. The Hayes court permitted the defendant to
avoid treatment analysis with a mere showing that the policy, though facially discriminatory, had a
"neutral impact" on the offspring of men and women. Hayes, 126 P.2d at 1548. In both Hayes and
Wright v. Olio Co1p., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982), the disparate impact analysis was distorted to
accommodate fetal protection because the courts believed that disparate treatment analysis would yield
unfair decisions for the plaintiffs. See supra notes 25 & 28. The courts concluded that the defendants
would fail on a straight BPOQ defense because the defendants could not prove that pregnancy or
fertility interfered with women's ability to perform their work. See Hayes, 126 P.2d at 1542; Wright,
697 F.2d at 1185.
"'Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207. The Court explained that safety offetuses could support
a BPOQ only if fetal safety were "indispensable to the particular business at issue" in the same way
that customer safety is indispensable to a business. /d. at 1205. Johnson Controls, moreover, couldnot have argued that the fetus constituted part of the employee so that employee safety would require
exclusion because an employee may usually elect to waive her own interest in working in a hazardfree environment. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).
'
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Although a unanimous decision, Johnson Controls was unanimous
only on the narrow facts of the case; that is, all of the justices agreed
that a fetal protection plan predicated on an employer's interest in
fetal health violated Title VII.46 The main points of disagreement
among the justices concerned where the decision left employers with
respect to the fetal injury quandary and the two potential escape
routes. First, the justices disagreed on whether employers forced by
federal law to expose fertile women to unavoidable fetal hazards
could invoke the doctrine of federal preemption in order to escape
state tort liability to the fetus.47 Second, the justices differed on
whether the prospect of fetal tort liability could support a Title VII
BFOQ even though the altruistic interest in fetal health could
not. 48
The Court's failure to agree is of no consequence, of course, if the
majority's holding can be considered to have encompassed decisions
on these issues. Although the facts of the case presented neither the
preemption issue nor the cost BFOQ issue, Justice Blackmun's opinion
for the majority made predictions on both.49 Justice Blackmun
predicted that Title VII would preempt tort law, so that employers
that complied with the Johnson Controls holding would not be liable
for fetal injury. 50 He also predicted that employers that violate
.ct 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10; id. at 1214-15 (White J., concurring); id. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
7
• See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
•• Although some commentators suggest that the Court in Johnson Controls struck down all fetal
protection plans, see, e.g., Women Workers ond Benign Bias, CHRisriAN SCI. MoNITOR, Mar. 25,
1991, at 20, in fact, Justice Blackmun stated that the issue of cost justification, as opposed to fetal
health justifications, was not before the Court, 111 S. Ct. at 1209; see also id. at 1216 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (acknowledging that Johnson Controls did not assert a cost-based BFOQ). See supra note
8 and accompanying text.
" The majority's statements regarding preemption are more clearly dicta than are its statements
on the BFOQ. See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208, 1209; id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Befort, supra note 24, at 50 (noting that the "majority [in
Johnson Controls] suggested, although without deciding, that compliance with Title VII may preempt
liability under state tort Jaws'). Blaclamm's statement regarding preemption was clearly dicta since
Johnson Controls was a Title VII suit and, therefore, preemption was not even a potential defense.
50
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1208-09 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963)). Justice Blackmun sunnised that even if Title VII does not preempt state tort
law, companies would not be at risk of liability for fetal injuries as long as the companies gave
adequate warnings and were not negligent. !d. at 1208. Justice Blackmun did not discuss state law that
imposes strict liability, although Justice White opined that strict liability was a possibility. !d. at 1211
{White, J., concurring) (citing REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 869 cmt. b (1979)). But see
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989) (en bane)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ("(S]o far as I know no child has recovered a judgment on account of
parents' occupational exposure to lead.'); Joanne 1. Ervin, Title VII: Misapplication ofthe Business
Necessity Defense, 15 U. DAYTON L. REv. 241, 280-84 (1990) (arguing that the possibility of fetal
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Johnson Controls in order to avert fetal injuries will be able to predicate
a BFOQ defense on the need to avoid the costs of tort liability.51 Justice
Blackmun's statements, whether or not they are dicta, are likely to guide
lower courts confronting these issues.52 In fact, they have already led
some commentators to conclude that the BFOQ is entirely unavailable in
the fetal protection context.53 Nevertheless, as explained below, the
BFOQ defense may sometimes hold more promise for employers than the
federal preemption doctrine.

II.

WHETHER TITLE

VIT SHOULD PREEMPT

STATE FETAL TORT LAW

When state law and federal law conflict,54 creating no-win situations
for those governed by both laws, the state law becomes a prime target for
tort liability is remote).
"

1

Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209.

n The concurring justices took issue with both of these conclusions. Justice White, joined by

Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, believed that Johnson Controls might be able to show
that it would be liable in tort to the injured offspring of female employees, even if such liability
could be predicated only on negligence, rather than strict liability. !d. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
In addition, Justice White argued that warnings to the parents could not absolve the employer of tort
liability to the offspring. Id. The concurring justices also argued that Title VII would not preempt
the state tort laws giving rise to such liability. Justice Scalia suggested that the Title VII BFOQ
defense may be intended to accommodate state tort law. !d. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Under
this view, rather than Title VII preempting state tort liability, the BFOQ defense would become
operative in the face of such liability. !d. Title VII, rather than tort law, would give way. [d. Both
Justice White and Justice Scalia concurred in the result of the case because Johnson Controls had
not offered a cost-justification defense. Id. at 1214-15 (White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
1
" See, e.g., Postol & Adelman, supra note 10, at 37; see supra note 48. The case is likely to guide
courts on both the BFOQ and the preemption issue. Thus, without deciding the issue, the Johnson
Controls case plants a seed that may grow to full-blown preemption when the issue is ripe. Regardless
of what result a full analysis under traditional preemption doctrine would yield, there is now the
possibility that lower courts will rely on Justice Blackmun's dicta in Johnson Controls as controlling
the preemption issue.
~ The term "state law" in preemption analysis encompasses state common law, as well as state
statutes and local laws of various sorts. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620
(1992); Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (citing City
ofBurbank v. Lockheed AirTenninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973)); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Cmp.,
464 U.S. 238, 247-48 (1984); Richard C. Ausness, Cigarette Company Liability: Preemption, Public
Policy, and Alternative Compensation Systems, 39 8\'RACUSE L. REv. 897, 914 (1988). In addition,
"federal law," as used in preemption discussion, encompasses not only federal statutory law, but also
federal regulations. See Automated Medical Lab., 471 U.S. at 713 (citing Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v.
Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984)); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 15354 (1982); see also United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 381-83 (1961) (finding that federal
regulatory scheme at issue was "meant to displace inconsistent state law").
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the federal preemption doctrine.55 Federal law that preempts state law
effectively renders the state law inoperative.56 If an employer complies
with the federal law requiring inclusion of women in a workplace that
contains fetal hazards, and if state law renders the employer liable for
resultant fetal injwy, the employer can escape tort liability only if the
federal law preempts the state law.57 As argued below, and despite
Justice Blackmun's predictions to the contrary, state tort law imposing
liability for fetal harm may withstand the preemption challenge.58

A. Traditional Preemption Doctrine
In theory at least, the preemption doctrine allows federal law to
supplant state law only if Congress intends a preemptive effect.59 Absent
ss See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992). This
doctrine effectuates the Supremacy Clause, which provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States wlllch shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority ofthe United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contmy notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI., cl. 2. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117 (1st Cir.)
(citing Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986)), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956
(1989).
"See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617 (citing Mazyland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981));
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 16-17 (1824). The preemption issue may arise in either of
two procedural postures. Those challenging the state law (or other exercise of state power) may bring
a suit seeking an injunction against operation of the allegedly preempted state law. See, e.g.,
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 577, 588-89 (1987) (holding that a
plaintiff who mounts a facial challenge to state statute must demonstrate that there are no possible
constructions of the act that would not warrant preemption). In the alternative, the issue may be
raised as a defense when suit is brought pursuant to the state law alleged to be preempted. See, e.g.,
Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 246.
57
In Johnson Controls, Justice Blackmun relied upon the potential for such preemption when he
rejected the idea that the BFOQ might be predicated upon tort liability to those who were damaged
as fetuses. 111 S. Ct. at 1208-09.
51
Although the preetnption inquity turns on the particular facts of the case, see City of Burbank
v. Lockheed AirTenninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); Elaine M. Martin, Note, The Burger Court
and Preemption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1233, 1234 (1985),
it is, of course, necessazy to rely on generalities in order to make predictions about the application
of preemption doctrine to state fetal tort laws.
51
See Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2617 (citing Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504
(1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2381-82 (1992) (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
471 U.S. 202, 208 (1978) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978)));
Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299 (1988); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987); Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368
(1986). Intent, of course, must frequently be inferred because Congress does not always give
deliberative thought to the question of whether a given federal statute should preempt state law. See,
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some demonstrable evidence of intent, Congress is presumed not to have
intended such an effect.60 This presumption against preemption is
particularly strong where the state regulation is an exercise of the state's
police powers.61
There are three avenues by which Congress can be found to have
intended a preemptive effect.62 One of these is the rarely employed
e.g., California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733-38 (1949); cf. Kenneth L. Hirsch, Toward a New View
of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L. FoRUM 515, 542. But see Paul Wolfson, Preemption and
Federalism: The Mzssing Link, 16 HAsriNGs CoNsr. L.Q. 69, 87 (1988) (noting that many

preemption cases are resolved without reference to congressional intent). However, contrary to the
usual pronouncement regarding congressional intent, congressional intent is irrelevant where there
is direct conflict between the federal and state laws. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
10
See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S.
117, 127 (1973) (In preemption analysis, ''the proper approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both
statutoxy schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted."') (quoting Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
11
See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617; Pacific Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Resources
Consetvation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 157 (1978); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1963) (citations
omitted). Although some cases suggest that the presumption against preemption of a state's exercise
of police power operates primarily in the field preemption conteXt, see infra notes 65-68 and
accompanying text (explaining field preemption), other cases suggest that the presumption applies
to all types of preemption. Compare Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
(finding an overriding presumption for all types of preemption that cOurts should assume ''that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress") and Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 153 (1982) ("'[The} relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when
there is conflict with a valid federal law."') (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)) with
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (finding, in cases of field preemption, a
presumption in favor of state laws in areas traditionally regulated by the $tes). This presumption
is, in turn, bolstered when the exercise of police power focuses particularly on issues of health and
safety, and when the state law provides a remedy not duplicative of federal law. See William L.
Lynch, Note, A Framework for Preemption Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363, 381 (1978) (recognizing that
a mechanism within the federal law which provides the same protection as the state law at issue is
a significant factor in support of preempting the state law) (citations omitted); cf. Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624, 629-32, 638-39 (1973) (finding preemption of state law
acceptable where federal law protects the interests in question).
n E.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987); Michigan Canners &
Freezers Ass'n, Inc. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984). The First
Circuit has cautioned that while "[t]he different forms of preemption are usually summarized by neat
citations to familiar Supreme Court Authority. • •• these ready citations list, but do not describe, and
catalog, but do not define, any real distinctions among the various types of preemption." Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 624 (1st Cir. 1987); see also English v. General Electric Co., 496
U.S. 72, 86 n.5 (1990) (finding the preemption categories not absolute). But see Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 444 (1960) ("Although verbal generalizations do not
of their own motion decide concrete cases, it is nevertheless within the framework of these basic
principles that the issue ••• [of preemption] nrust be determined.''); Dion W. Hayes, Note,
Emasculating State Environmental Enforcement: The Supreme Court's Selective Adoption of the
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device of express legislative language.63 Congress may expressly
preempt an entire field of regulatory activity or a specified portion
thereof. Title VII does not contain such express preemption of state law,
although it does contain what Justice Scalia has termed "antipre-emption,
provisions, which are discussed below.64
The other two methods of finding a congressional intention to
preempt are by implication.65 Implied preemption occurs as either "field
preemption" or "conflict preemption." Federal law implicitly occupies the
field when it so pervasively regulates an area that there is, in effect, "no
room for the states to supplement it," 66 or when it regulates an area of
such dominant federal interest that the states are simply not permitted to
Preemption Doctrine, 16 WM. & MARY J. ENvn. L. 30, 32, 36 (1991) (noting that although the
three categories ofpreemption are not rigidly distinct, insufficient evidence of one type of preemption
cannot combine with insufficient evidence of another type of preemption to effectuate preemption).
" See, e.g., Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2617 (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977)); see also Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 (1983) (discussing ''the scope of
several provisions of ERISA that speak expressly to the question of pre-emption''). It is unnecessacy
for Congress to provide statutorily that a piece of federal legislation will preempt conflicting state
laws because such federal law preempts the state law by operation of the Supremacy Clause, without
reference to congressional intent underlying the statute. See U.S. CoNsr. art. VI., cl. 2. A finding of
such actual conflict, then, dispenses with the need to inquire into congressional intent See Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Wolfson, supra note 59, at 88. But
cf. S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REv. 685, 726
(1991) (recognizing a judicial trend offocusing on constitutional preemption under the Supremacy
Clause instead of statutory conflict). On the other hand, when preemption is effectuated by agency
regulation, rather than statute, the Supreme Court has voiced an expectation that the agency "declare
any intention to pre-empt state law with some specificity." California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite
Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572, 583 (1987) (citing Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc.,
471 u.s. 707, 718 (1985)).
. " California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Such provisions provide either that the statute is not intended to have a preemptive
effect, or that the scope of any intended preemption is limited in a specified way. See, e.g., Gade v.
National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2382 (1992) (recognizing limitations on
preemption in the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's savings clause). There are two
provisions in the 1964 Civil Rights Act that expressly pertain to limitations on preemption. See infra
notes 72-92 and accompanying text. Congress' enactment of such provisions delineating the
preemptive effect of its laws has not eliminated the Supreme Court's role of applying preemption
doctrine to consttue such provisions. See Gade, 112 S. Ct at 238; Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282-90.
•s See, e.g., Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citations omitted); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 141-43. Cf. Jose L.
Fernandez, The Purpose Test: Shielding State Environmental Statutes from the Sword ofPreemption,
41 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1202, 1208 (1990) ("Labeling preemption as ..• implied does little in
providing the Court with an analytical tool.'').
"See, e.g., Gade, 112 S. Ct. at 2383 (citing Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))).
Throughout the remainder of this Article "field preemption" is used to denote "implied field
preemption," rather than express field preemption, which is denominated as "express."
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act within the area.07 If the federal government is deemed to have
occupied a given field, then the test of whether federal law in that area
preempts a particular state law is whether the state law regulates a matter
already regulated by federal law.68
The second type of implied preemption, "conflict preemption," 69 is
the only relevant category for pwposes of the Title VII/fetal tort inquiry.
Preemptive conflict may take one of two forms. Such conflict occurs
either when it is physically impossible for one to comply with both
federal and state law at the same time ("impossibility preemption"),70 or
when "state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
pwposes and objectives of Congress" ("obstacle preemption").71
" See. e.g., De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 153 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)); CityofBwbank v. Lockheed AirTerrninal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); United
States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 380-83 (1961); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 730-31 (1949); cf.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 143-44 (analyzing whether the maturity of
avocadoes is an area requiring "exclusive federal regulation.,). This doctrine was originally articulated
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., in which the Court cited a third categozy of field preemption
where ''the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of the obligation
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose [to preclude state regulation]." 331 U.S. at 230-31. One
sc:holar. has argued that this third categozy has not been successfully used as an independent ground
for finding field preemption. See Charles B. Wiggins, Federalism Balancing and the Burger Court:
California's Nuclear Law as a Preemption Case Study, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1, 40 (1979-80)..
" Field preemption does not require that there be a conflict between the two laws. See Capital
Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). On the contrary, in deciding whether the
federal law preempts state law, the Supreme Court looks at the extent to which the state regulation
has an impact in the area (or field) that Congress has occupied. Some impact on such decision
making is acceptable. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 86 (1990) (citing Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 185-86 (1988)). But see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, Cotp., 464
U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given
field, any state law falling within that field is preempted.") (citations omitted). Cf. Fernandez, supra
note 65, at 1204 (arguing that "a puxpose-based analysis is as valid ••. as an effects-based test for
preemption").
H See Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300; Perzy v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987); CTS Cotp.
v. Dynamics Cotp., 481 U.S. 69, 78-79 (1987); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248 (citing Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources
Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 479-93 (1974); Hines v: Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); Wood v. General Motors
Corp., 673 F. Supp. 1108, 1112-13 (D. Mass. 1987), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1065 (1990); Ronald D.
Rotunda, Sheathing the Sword of Federal Preemption, 5 CoNsr. COMM. 311, 317 (1988).
70
See Capital Cities Cable Inc., 467 U.S. at 699; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373
U.S. at 142-43. InMcDennott v. Wisconsin, for example, the Court forbade state prosecution ofretail
merchants for labeling products in a manner required by federal law, but impennissible under state
law. 228 U.S. 115, 133·34 (1913). Compliance with both laws at once was a physical impossibility.
[d. at 132-33. See generally Donald P. Rothsc:hild, A Proposed "Tonic" with Florida Lime to
Celebrate our New Federalism: How to Deal with the ''Headache" ofPreemption, 38 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 829, 842 (1984) (advocating broader use of "dual compliance.. test). This type of conflict has
also been described as a "prohlbition of dutiful conduct." Lynch, supra note 61, at 366.
71
Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 300; California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S.
572, 581 (1987) (quoting Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248). But see Stein Distrib. Co. v. Bureau of Alcohol,
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Two provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act focus specifically on the
Act's preemptive scope, and so potentially govern Title VII's impossibility and obstacle preemption capabilities. One of these is located in Title
VII itself,72 and the other is in Title XI of the Act.73 There is disagreement among the Justices of the Supreme Court, however, on the question
of whether Title VII preemption is covered exclusively by the Title VII
provision or whether the Title XI provision applies as well.74

B. Purpose and Scope of Sections 708 and 1104
Section 708 of Title VII and section 1104 of Title XI contain
preemption "saving clauses"75 that are effectively identical in all but one
pertinent respect.'6 Both legislatively eliminate the potential for field
Tobacco & Firearms, 779 F.2d 1407, 1412 (9th Cir.) (suggesting that the query is whether
compliance with federal law would obstruct accomplishment of the purposes of state law), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1111 (1986). The Supreme Court first articulated the "obstacle" preemption test in
the case of Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 n.11 (1941), as a way of generalizing what is
required for preemption of all sorts. Subsequent courts have sometimes adhered to the Hines
articulation of this second type of conflict preemption as simply another way of phrasing the field
and impossibility inquiries. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (citing Hines, 312
U.S. at 67); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
495 U.S. 956 (1990). In addition to the "obstacle" label, such conflict has been refem:d to variously
as "impairment," Hoke, supra note 63, at 741 n.257, "hindrance," Lynch, supra note 61, at 369, and
''frustration," Rothschild, supra note 70, at 857. This Article adheres to the "obstacle" label,
borrowing from the Hines language.
n 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
n Id. § 2000h-4.
74
See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
75
See generally Lynch, supra note 61, at 365-66 (explaining saving clauses). In a concurring
opinion, Justice Scalia called these provisions ''antipre-emption" provisions because they seek to
limit, rather than effectuate, federal preemption of state law. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 295-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
" Section 708 states:
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person from any
liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or future law of any State
or political subdivision of a State, other than any such law which purports to require or
pemrit the doing of any act which would be an unlawful employment practice under this
subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988).
Section 1104 provides:
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an intent on the
part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title operates to the exclusion of
State laws on the same subject matter, nor shall any provision of this Act be construed as
invalidating any provision of State law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of
the purposes of this Act, or any provision thereof.
§ 2000h-4 (1988).
42

u.s.c.
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preemption.77 Both preserve the potential for impossibility preemption.
The difference is that section 1104 of Title XI permits obstacle preemption, and section 708 of Title VII does not.78
The Supreme Court debated the applicability of section 1104 to Title
VII in California Federal Savings & Loan v. Guerra. 79 In Guerra, the
Supreme Court held that Title VII's Pregnancy Discrimination Act, or
PDA, did not preempt a California law requiring that employers provide
certain benefits to pregnant employees.80 The employer argued that the
state's pregnancy benefit requirement conflicted with the PDA requirement that pregnant workers receive the same treatment as workers
disabled by conditions other than pregnancy.81 A majority of the Court
considered this preemption issue under section 1104, as well as under
section 708.82
Initially applying an impossibility preemption analysis, the Guerra
Court concluded that the state law did not require any act that would
violate the PDA.83 This result followed directly from the Court's
construction of the PDA. The Court announced that the PDA permits
employers to provide pregnant workers with benefits superior to those
provided to workers disabled by conditions other than pregnanqy.84 Even
accepting the defendanes argument that the PDA prohibits disparity in
benefits, the Court concluded that impossibility preemption would not
apply.85 In the majority's view, the California law simply required
employers to provide certain minimum benefits to workers disabled by
pregnancy, but did not impose a maximum limit on what could be given
to nonpregnant workers.86 Thus, there was nothing to keep employers
77

Needless to say, by excluding such implied preemption, Congress made clear that it was not
engaged in express preemption either.
11
Because Title VII's preemption provision was aimed at preserving state fair employment laws,
rather than state tort laws, tbexe is a question of whether it should limit preemption of tort laws at
all. See Guerra, 479 U.S. at 282·83.
"Id. at 281·82.
10
!d. at 292.
11
/d. at 278-79.
az Id. at 282.
u /d. at 290.
" /d. at 284. A total of five justices agreed on this point Joining in Justice Marshall's opinion
for the Court were Justices Brennan, Blackmun and O'Conner. !d. at 273. Justice Stevens agreed on
this aspect of the Court's opinion. !d. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring).
u !d. at 290-91. Here, Justice Stevens agreed with Justice Marshall's opinion, id. at 295 (Stevens,
J., concurring), and Justice Scalia found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether conflict
would exist ifthe PDA imposed a ceiling on pregnancy benefits, id. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring).
11
ld. at 290-92. The majority was not deterred in this conclusion by the Ifact that the employer
might en'counter significant cost requirements in the process of elevating the benefit levels of all its
employees to the benefit level of pregnant workers. This burden did not demonstrate a preemptive
conflict See id. at 291 (relying on petitioners' concession at oral argument "that compliance with both
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from providing nonpregnant workers the same level of benefits given to
pregnant workers. Hence, impossibility preemption would not result.
Having found that the PDA did not preempt the state law under
impossibility analysis, the Guerra Court nevertheless went on to apply
obstacle preemption analysis, as embodied in section 1104.87 The Court's
analysis on this issue was brief. It simply found that the challenged
California law had a common purpose with Title VII, and did not stand
as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of Title VII.88 Guerra
thus assessed both types of conflict preemption and concluded that the
California statute manifested neither.89
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia echoed the majority's view that
California law did not require a violation of the PDA, and thus concluded
that preemption was not a possibility.90 Unlike the majority, however,
Justice Scalia viewed section 708 as the only preemption provision
relevant to the question of Title VII's preemptive scope.91 Because
section 708 more narrowly restricts the scope of Title VII preemption
than section 1104 restricts preemption for the entire Act, applying section
1104 would have the effect of permitting forms of preemption forbidden
by the very terms of Title VII.92
statutes 'istheoretically possible"') (quoting Tr. of Oral Argwnent 6); infra text accompanying notes
115-19 (discussing dual liability as not a preemptive conflict). The Guerra dissent argued that the
PDA. by its terms, fo.tbids more favorable treatment of pregnant workers than of nonpregnant
workers. 479 U.S. at 298-99 (White, J., dissenting).
n Guerra, 479 U.S. at 289.
n !d. But see infra text accompanying note 139 (diSGUSSing the test for obstacle preemption as
something more than whether the goals of the federal and state law are the same).
., Guerra, 479 U.S. at 292. But see infra note 93 (noting scholarly disagreement with the
applicability of section 1104 to Title VII preemption).
"' Guerra, 479 U.S. at 296 (Scalia, J., concurring) (rejecting the possibility of preemption
because the California law did "not remotely purport to require or pennit any refusal to accord
federally mandated equal treatment to others similarly situated''). It was, in Justice Scalia's view,
unnecessacy to reach the question of whether the PDA prohibits preferences based on pregnancy. !d.
at 296.
" !d. at 295.
91
ld. In other words, because the preemption provision specifically applicable to Title VII
provides for less preemption than was possible under section 1104, Justice Scalia found the latter to
be irrelevant
The,three-justice Guerra dissent did not need to reach the question ofwheth~ section 1104
obstacle preemption was a possibility. It found physical impossibility preemption under section 708.
!d. at 298 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent construed the PDA to forbid preferences based on
pregnancy and construed the California law to require that greater benefits be given to pregnant
workers than to other workers. Id. The dissent argued that, "lb]ecause the California law pennits
employers to single out pregnancy for preferential treatment and therefore violate Title VII, it is not
saved by § 708 which limits pre-emption of state laws to those that require or pennit an employer
to commit an unfair employment practice." /d.

1992-93]

EMPLOYER'S FETAL INnJRY QUANDARY

659

Although disagreement on the question of whether Title VII is
capable of obstacle preemption may seem to confuse the Title VII/fetal
tort issue, the importance of the disagreement in this context is more
apparent than real.93 In theory, analysis of the Title VII/fetal tort
preemption question under the impossibility doctrine is far less likely to
yield preemption than is analysis under the obstacle doctrine. Situations
where it is physically impossible to comply with the two laws are less
likely to occur than situations where the state law merely stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment of federal purpose.94 Nevertheless, in the
Title VII/fetal tort context, the two approaches will prove to be largely
indistinguishable.95 Under either approach, the chances of preemption
appear far less likely than Justice Blackmun surmised in Johnson

Controls. 96
C. Conflict Preemption
It is clear that there is some tension between the Title VII Johnson
Controls decision on the one hand and state tort law liability for fetal
harm on the other. The state law exerts pressure to violate the federal law
because, by violating the federal law, an employer could avert state tort
liability.97 What is less clear is whether that tension is sufficient to result
in preemption.
Impossibility preemption analysis differs from obstacle preemption
analysis with respect to how tension is measured. Impossibility analysis
looks for mutual exclusivity of operation in the two laws.98 Obstacle
analysis engages in a more ephemeral assessment of statutory goals. 99 In
13

In his treatise American Constitutional Law, Professor Laurence Tribe agrees with Justice
Scalia that the "antipreemption" provision of Title VII should not be read to pennit preemption where
there is no facial conflict between the federal and state laws. LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUnONAL LAw 482-83 n.8 (2d ed. 1988).
" See infra notes 98-149 and accompanying text (discussing strictures of impossibility and
obstacle preemption).
"See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text (discussing similarity between the two conflict
preemption tests in the Title VII/fetal tort context).
N See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., ll1 S. Cl ll96, 1208-09 (1991).
17
The Johnson Controls decision should be read to require employers to make the workplace
as safe as possible for all employees and their offspring. See supra note 40. The preemption issue
should arise only where it is impossible for the employer to make the workplace safe for the
offspring of fertile women. See supra note 19.
" See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987).
" "Deciding whether a state statute is in conflict with a federal statute and hence invalid under
the Supremacy Clause is essentially a two step process of first ascertaining the construction of the
two statutes and then detennining the constitutional question [of] whether they are in conflict." Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971).
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the Title VII/fetal tort context, however, there is no significant distinction.1oo

1. Impossibility Preemption
Because section 1104, which permits obstacle preemption, 101 may
be inapplicable to Title VII, that Title's preemptive scope arguably is
confined to impossibility preemption. 102 Thus, only if Title VII requires
one action and state tort law requires an incompatible action, so that the
employer must literally choose between the two required actions, is
federal preemption of state law assured103 Such true impossibility is
rare inasmuch as courts are under a duty to reconcile the two laws if
possible. 104
Defendants advancing the impossibility preemption argument in the
Title VII/fetal tort situation are likely to lose. If the analysis turns on the
intended mandates of the state law, courts will find these mandates to be
entirely consistent with inclusion of women in the workplace. Only when
the analysis turns away from the intended requirements of the state law,
focusing instead on the unintended, incidental, effects of the state law, is
preemption conceivable. Yet, as explained below, permitting the analysis
to reach into such incidental effects does not comport with the reconciliation requirement.
Impossibility pr~emption analysis begins with the task of discerning
exactly what the two laws require: what act does the state fetal tort law
I«~

See infra notes 141-47 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (1988).
101
See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
103
See Gue"a, 479 U.S. at 281 (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S.
132, 142-43 (1963)); id. at 295-96 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (1988)). But
see Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 501-02 (1986)
(holding, despite apparent impossibility of compliance with both laws at once, that Congress did not
intend to supplant an important state law).
The impossibility preemption cases are sometimes lumped together with other cases of"explicit
conflict." See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43. The analysis in this Article categorizes the explicit
conflicts, such as that in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 159 (1978), as express
preemption, and therefore, does not analyze them
1
.. See California Coastal Comm' n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 578, 586 (1987) (construing
state law to allow consistency with the federal law); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949)
("it 'must be clear that the federal provisions are inconsistent with those of the state to justifY the
thwarting of state regulation"') (quoting Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 157-59
(1942)); cf. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 446 (1960) (discussing duty
not to seek out conflicts between state and federal regulations where none exists) (citations omitted);
see also James A. Riddle, Note, Preemption of Reconcilable State Regulation: Federal Benefit
Schemes v. State Marital Property Law, 34 HAsriNGS L.J. 685, 691-92 & n.51 (1983) (acknowledging that impossibility preemption should be found only when the federal and state law are
"iueconcilable").
101
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require the employer to do, and is this compelled deed capable of being
done at the same time the employer is performing all acts required by
Title VII?105 The Johnson Controls decision plainly sets forth the
requirements of the federal law in this context: namely, the inclusion of
women without regard to their fertility. 106 Identifying the state law
requirements is more complex.
It is physically impossible to comply with both Title VII and state
tort law only if the tort law is construed to require employers to exclude
from the workplace women whose inclusion is guaranteed by Title
VII. 107 A decision about whether state law requires exclusion of such
women depends on whether the decision maker is constrained by the
direct mandates of the state law or is instec,Ld free to consider the practical
results of the state law's operation. 108 The state law's direct mandates are
different from the state law's intended, but unexpressed, mandates, which,
in turn, may differ from the state law's unintended, but inevitable,
coercive effect.
a. State Law's Direct Mandates

If only direct mandates are relevant,109 then a facially "benign"
purpose can save a state law that, in operation, effectuates a violation of
federal law. 110 State fetal tort laws do not directly compel employers
lel See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644 (1971). Needless to say, "act" is used here to
encompass both the notion of required action and required fotbearance from action.
lc& See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199, 1210 (1991).
107
Whether pressures imposed by tort-damages awards are considered under impossibility or
obstacle analysis could also make a difference with regard to the police power presumption. For a
discussion of the police power presumption, see supra note 61 and accompanying text. The
presumption against federal preemption of state laws protecting health and safety arguably applies
in obstacle, but not impossibility cases. See Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 54 (1981) (holding
that '"[t]he relative importance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a[n]
[impossibility] conflict with a valid federal law"') (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666
(1962)); cf. Lynch, supra note 61, at 364 (arguing that preemption of any sort is unlikely when the
challenged state law protects vital interests within the state's borders-particularly state laws
protecting against physical injury within the state's borders).
•e~ It has been suggested that impossibility conflict preemption should occur only when the two
laws' conflicting requirements are express. See Lynch, supra note 61, at 366. No state law currently
in effect expressly requires exclusion of fertile women in order to avoid fetal injury.
109
See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43 (equating impossibility conflict with "explicit conflict'').
110
The discussion in the text focuses on the pwposes of the state law in the sense that state law
is designed to, or does in fact, effectuate a certain end. This should be distinguished from two other
broader contexts in which pwposes are considered in preemption doctrine. One is the context of field
preemption, in which a state law's operation upon the same subject matter that the federal law
operates upon has the effect of preempting the state law. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text. The other is in the context of obstacle preemption, in which the Supreme Court has stressed that
neither consistency nor identity of the federal and state goals is sufficient to save a state law that
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either to avoid all fetal injury or to exclude women in an effort to avoid
such injury. For the most part, the common law judgments that comprise
state fetal tort law simply require that employers pay damages based on
injuries to the fetus once the harm has been done.m Hence, compliance
with the state law, by paying damages, does not render compliance with
Title VII impossible.112 If the inquiry focuses only on the acts that the
state law directly requires, then the state fetal tort law in no way conflicts
with federal anti-discrimination law, and therefore cannot be preempted

b. State Law's Indirect Mandates
i. Damage Awards as Coercion
Although a state law does not directly mandate violation of the
federal law, it may nevertheless indirectly mandate a violation.113 The
damages that fetal tort law imposes may have a coercive effect, whether
intentionally or inadvertently.114 Damages arguably compel whatever

"'stands as an obstacle"' to the accomplishment of a federal pUipOse. See Gade v. National Solid
Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2385 (1992) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941)).
111
The universal rule is that a child born alive may maintain a tort action to recover damages for
prenatal injuries. See McElveen, supra note 11, at 563; see also Bolen v. Bolen, 409 F. Supp. 1371,
1372 (W.D. Va. 1975) (summarizing the current status of the law regarding a child's right to recover
for prenatal injuries) (quoting Ronald F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40
AL.R.3d 1222, 1228 (1971)).
m Cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Cl 2608, 2628 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (A manufacturer ..may decide to accept damages awards as a cost of
doing business and not alter its behavior in any way."); Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d
1529 (D.C. Cir.) ("[C}ompliance with both federal and state law cannot be said to be impossible:
Chevron can continue to use the EPA-approved label and can at the same time pay damages to
successful tort plaintiffs."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); cf. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co.,
844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.) (holding that federal law regarding vaccinations does not preempt state tort
laws), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988). In the conflict preemption context, it does not matter that
the employer experiences additional burdens as a result of being subject to two laws, rather than just
the federal law, as long as the two burdens imposed are not mutually exclusive. State law is not
preempted simply by virtue of the fact that it imposes on the employer obligations above and beyond
those imposed by the federal law. See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733, 737 (1949) (double
punishment acceptable). Damages may, in effect, coerce action that conflicts with the requirements
of federal law. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2620. This constitutes an unexpressed mandate (discussed
below), rather than an express mandate. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying texl
m See Cipollone, 112 S. Cl at 2620 (arguing that common law actions premised on the existence
of a legal duty impose requirements or prohibitions).
114
The concept of damages as regulation has often arisen in the field preemption context If
Congress has preempted an area, then the inquicy is whether the states are attempting to regulate a
subject within that area. In the impossibility preemption context, the damages as regulation inquicy
focuses not on whether the state is regulating within a federally preempted field, but rather whether
the state is requiring the defendant to act in a manner inconsistent with behavior required by federal
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behavior would enable the employer to avoid further imposition of such
damages. 115
Several Supreme Court cases that declined to preempt state laws'
imposition of damages for activities also covered by federal law involve
situations fundamentally different from the Title VII/fetal tort scenario.116 The Supreme Court decisions in question upheld state laws that
focus on the same subject matter as the federal law where it is possible
to comply with both laws at once. 117 The state laws in such cases
simply impose heightened standards for behavior already regulated by
federal law. 118 This relationship between the federal and state law does

law. Though the question is asked for different reasons, the question remains largely one and the
same: is the state law, by providing for tort damages, requiring or coercing the defendant to act in
a particular way? One difference, however, is the function of state pmpose in the analysis. For the
field preemption inquhy, courts focus on whether the states intend to operate in the forbidden arena,
ignoring incidental side effects that compliance with the state law may have on federal interests. In
the impossibility context, courts focus exclusively on the practical requirements the state law imposes
on the defendant. Hence, the state'spmpose is irrelevant here just as it will be in the obstacle conflict
situation. Accordingly, in his Silkwood dissent, Justice Powell stated "[t)here is no element of
regulation when compensatocy damages are awarded, especially when liability is imposed without
fault as authorized by state law." Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 276 n.3 (1984)
(Powell, J., dissenting). Although Justice Powell's observation applies to field preemption analysis,
it is not applicable to impossibility conflict preemption analysis.
"' See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Gannon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (finding an
obligation to pay compensation to be a potent fotm of regulation); cf. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 276
(Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that punitive damages are regulatot.y). But see Cipollone, 112 S. Ct.
at 2628-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that state common law
damages do not amount to direct regulation); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 930
n.30 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting view that common
law damages effectively regulate).
m See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90-(1990) (holding that an employee
could recover in tort for employer•s retaliatot.y response to employee's reporting of employer•s
violation of federal nuclear safety standards); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249-58 (allowing tort recovet.y
for plutonium contamination of employee even though federal law occupied the nuclear energy field
including all safety aspects ofplant operation). Similarly, in Wood v. General Motors Corp., 673 F.
Supp. 1108 (D. Mass. 1987), the court held that tort damages were not preempted by federal law
because the defendant could simply make an economic choice to compensate future victims and
continue in its tortious activity. !d. at 1113.
117
See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1208-09 (1991)
(distinguishing between state laws that expand upon the requirements of the federal laws and state
laws that make compliance with federal law impossible).
111
See English, 496 U.S. at 88-90 (distinguishing between state tort law allowing for recovecy
for nuclear injucy and federal law pertaining to nuclear safety); Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 249-58 (same);
see also Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("mere compliance
with [federal or state] regulatot.y labeling requirements does not preclude a [jucy from] finding that
additional warnings should have been given'); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 421
(5th Cir. 1985) (compliance with federal automobile safety standards does not exempt manufacturer
from tort liability); Schwartz v. Volvo N. Am. Corp., 554 So. 2d 927, 939 (Ala. 1989) (Hornsby, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing numerous cases for the proposition that compliance
with federal safety standards is not a defense to state tort claims against automobile manufacturers).
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not make it impossible for an individual to comply with both laws at
once.119
In the Title VII/fetal tort context, by contrast, the two laws pull in
opposite directions. Rather than simply imposing a heightened standard to
encourage exactly the behavior the federal law mandates, state tort law tends
to encourage employers to engage in precisely the behavior that the federnl
law forbids. In this setting, damages can create an impossibility conflict if
they exert sufficient pressure on the employer to cause the exclusion of
women from the workplace. The question is: how much pressure is required?
The probable answer is that there must be sufficient pressure on the employer
to effectuate the feared exclusion. As explained below, the hypothetical threat
of a Title VII violation will not be enough.
ii. Intended Coercion

If the analysis focuses on acts that state law does not expressly require,
but that it nevertheless intentionally coerces, the potential for impossibility
preemption is greater than where the analysis merely focuses on the express
mandates of the state law.'20 Even considering these unexpressed, but
intended, mandates of fetal tort law, however, a preemption result is unlikely.
Whether the state tort law rests on theories of negligence or strict liability,
neither presents truly fertile grounds for preemption.
If negligence law is viewed as coercive, its goal is to cause the
employer to take reasonable precautions to avert fetal injury. Negligence
law thus may effectively coerce the employer to exclude women from the
workplace, if exclusion is the only way that the employer can avoid fetal
injury. 121 The "reasonable precautions" that negligence law requires,
however, should not be deemed to include expulsion of women from the
workplace. Such expulsion is not a legally available option, and thus is not

Judge Hornsby also asserted that the imposition of state common law tort damages does not amount
to regulation. I d. at 943. Hornsby explained that a defendant can pay the jury verdict and comply
with the minimal federal standard, rather than adhere to the heightened safety standard that the jury
imposes. Id.
Although the Supreme Court may permit damages where state law imposes a standard higher
than the federal standard on the same subject matter, federal law forbids such state standards if the
federal law has occupied a field encompassing the matter that results in state tort liability. See supra
notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
1
" See Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256.
1
m Professor Wiggins has suggested that the impossibility category of preemption should actually
focus on whether the laws are facially in conflict, rather than (or in addition to) on whether it is
impossible to comply with both. See Wiggins, supra note 67, at 43.
121
This Article focuses only on the plight of the employer who is unable to avert injury by the
use of mechanisms short of excluding women. See supra note 19.
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"reasonable."122 An employer that takes all legally available precautions
should, in principle, not be found liable under a negligence theory.123
If negligence law does not intend to coerce exclusion of women, it
is even more clear that strict liability law is not intended to effectuate this
result. On the contrary, a major purpose of strict liability law is the
allocation of loss, rather than modification of tortfeasor behavior}24
State strict liability law thus does not intentionally require action in
contravention of Title VII.125 Like the state law's direct mandates, the
state law's unexpressed, but intended, requirements do not coerce acts in
violation of Title VII. Whether predicated upon negligence or strict
liability, the state tort law is ''benign" in intent. Consequently, impossibility preemption is unlikely.
iii. Unintended Coercion

The third way of looking at state law requirements is to focus on the
inadvertent impact of the state law. State law may be read to require not
just the act that it mandates directly (payment of damages) and the act
that it intentionally, but implicitly, requires (e.g., t;aking reasonable
precautions to avoid fetal injury), but also any act that will inevitably,
although inadvertently, follow from the direct and implied mandates.
Because fetal tort law penalizes the employer for injuries that could be
121

If the state negligence law can be read to intend that the employer exclude women, even
though such exclusion violates the federal law, then the employer could avoid liability through the
preemption doctrine. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. Likewise, a state law that requires
the defendant to violate federal law is in direct conflict with the federal law, and thus preempted. See
supra note 55 and accompanying text.
•n International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991) (arguing
that, absent negligence, an employer that warns employees and complies with OSHA regulations
should not be liable). However, where such an employer is held liable, the coercive effect of the state
law is to facilitate violation of Title Vll. If, on the other hand, precautions other than exclusion of
women are available and the employer fails to take them, then liability results from the employer's
own dereliction of duty, rather than from the employer's compliance with Title VII.
m Likewise, finding no preemption is consistent with the whole notion of strict liability. The
strict liability rationale is that the employer finds it profitable enough to engage in this particularly
dangerous business and is, therefore, the proper party to bear the cost of damage done by the
business. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 cmt. d (1979) (strict liability founded upon policy
imposing on one who, for his own purposes, creates abnonnal risks of hann to his neighbors). The
negligence rationale is that, if the workplace cannot be made safe and fertile women must be
admitted, then it is unfair to subject the employer to lawsuits based on injuries the employer could
not avoid. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 282 cmL f(1979) (negligence does not include acts
"which, although done with every precaution ..• practicable .•• involve an irreducible minimum of
danger to others").
ns See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 276 n.3 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that there is no element of regulation when state tort law imposes compensatory damages
without allocating fault).
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avoided if the employer were to exclude women, arguably tort law
unintentionally requires the exclusion of such women. 126 A state tort law
that applies such "irresistible" pressure to exclude women arguably is
preempted in the same manner as a state statute that by its tenns or intent
requires exclusion of women.127 The inquiiy therefore becomes whether
the state tort liability for fetal hann is likely to create such irresistible
pressure to violate Title VII.
Given the context in which the irresistible pressure argument is likely
to arise, a fmding of preemption seems improbable. The most likely
occasion for the preemption argument is in a tort suit predicated on fetal
harm, in which the employer attempts to defend with the argument that
Title VII forbade the only expedient that could have averted the injury:
namely, exclusion of the mother.128 When this matter is before the
court, the defendant will not actually have been pushed over the
theoretical edge into violating Title VII, for its exposure to tort liability
will result precisely from compliance with Title VII. Instead, the
defending employer will argue that, if the court does not excuse the
employer from the strictures of the state tort law in this case, the financial
pressures of potential tort liability will be so severe as to compel the
employer (and perhaps other employers) to violate Title VII to avoid the
prospect of repeated liability. Only when extant employer liability history
demonstrates that the state tort law has actually caused Title VII
violations are courts likely to fmd that Title VII preempts the state tort
law in pending cases.
The question of whether fear of tort liability will cause violations of
Title VII will thus arise, at least initially, as a hypothetical threat, rather
than as a fact before the court. The conjectural character of the inquiry
does not bode well for employers invoking the defense. Courts commonly
126

The employer faced with the prospect of such liability may .find it more cost-effective to
exclude women from the workforce and pay them damages under Title VII, rather than admit the
women and pay tort damages based on fetal injwy. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
127
This situation differs from that where an entire federal scheme is thwarted by the state law.
See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. In the case of DPT vaccine injuries, for example, it
was argued that "[t]ort judgments threatened the availability of sufficient DPT vaccine to cany out
[the goal of federal] inununization programs." Peggy J. Naile, Note, Tort Liability for DPT Vaccine
Injury and the Preemption Doctrine, 22 IND. L. REv. 655, 693 (1989).
'a Most of the cases dealing with the question of whether federal law preempts state tort law
arise in the context of tort suits. See, e.g., English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990)
(tort suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S.
238, 243 (1984) (tort suit for plutonium contamination). Of course, employers have the option to
bring declaratocy judgment actions in an effort to establish preemption. See, e.g., Gade v. National
Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2379 (1992). When the state law alleged to be
preempted is statutocy, those challenging it may sue for declaratocy judgment, naming as defendants
those charged with enforcement of the state law. See, e.g., id.
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seek concrete evidence that the pressure exerted by state law damages is
actually causing violations of the federal law. 129
The Supreme Court's Guen'a decision supports the proposition that
financial burdens imposed by state law do not portend preemptive conflict
absent actual violations of the federal law. 130 The Guen'a Court was
willing to reject preemption even if the state law imposed pressure to
violate the federal law and even if the only measure available to avert the
need of such violation was extremely costly to the employer.131 In
Guerra, if the PDA required equality between benefits to pregnant
workers and others, the Court was willing to impose on the employer the
perhaps prohibitively costly requirement that it provide nonpregnant
workers the same benefits required by state law for pregnant workers. 132
As long as the employer could, in theory, bring its practices into
compliance with both laws, then preemption would not occur.133
Similarly, the employer in the Title VII/fetal tort.situation can achieve
the ends required by state law by a mechanism (payment of tort damages)
short of excluding women. in contravention of Title VII. 134 In fact, the

121

See Boyle v. United Tcx:hnologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 506-07 (1988); Rice v. Norman
Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 313 (1960). But see
Schneidewind v. ANRPipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293,310 (1988); Macyland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
751 (1981); Northern Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1963). As long
as the facts before the court present a situation in which it is the state rather than the federal law that
is violated, preemption is unlikely. Cf. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471
U.S. 707, 720-21 (1985) (holding that state law did not threaten accomplishment of federal goal);
Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 549 {1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that in
absence of explicit preemptive clause no preemption should be found); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 489-93 (1974) (holding state trade secret law not preempted by federal patent
law); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552 (1973) (holding that the power to grant copyrights
is not under exclusive federal control). But see Rath Pac/dng Co., 430 U.S. at 541 (holding state Jaw
that required different labeling information preempted because it was an obstacle to accomplishment
of federal purposes). The question is not just whether the employer will be tempted, but whether the
temptation will be irresistible.
ll<l See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 {1987).
1)1

[d.

m See id. (relying on petitioners' concession at oral argument "that compliance with both statutes
'is theoretically possible"') (quoting Tr. of Oral Argument 6).
m !d. at 290-92. Guemz suggests that the Supreme Court evaluates the question of whether dual
compliance is physically impossible, in theoretical tenns, without considering the practical feasibility.
/d. The Gue"a Court simply assumed that the State of California would be financially able to give
unpaid leave to nonpregnant workers. /d. at 291.
I:IC Heartless as it may sound, the payment of strict liability tort damages may be viewed, like
licensing requirements, as just another cost of doing business in compliance with applicable laws.
Admittedly, there is an important difference between the Guemz situation and the Title VII/fetal tort
situation. In the fonner, the employer is incurring costs in the fonn of payment of additional
employee benefits. In the latter, the employer is incurring costs in the fonn of damages resulting from
hann to fetuses, an expenditure undoubtedly repugnant for more than financial reasons. It should be
noted, however, that if the employer has made the workplace as safe as possible, it is the mother who
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employer's violation of the state law in the envisioned tort suit is
evidence that any irresistible urge will be in the direction of violating
state law, not federal law. Thus, the posture of the case before the
court actually goes a long way toward convincing the court that
irresistible pressure is not present.
2. Obstacle Preemption

State laws that impose "obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and
execution ofthe full purposes and objectives of Congress" are deemed
contrary to federal law for purposes of preemption analysis. 135
Although the Supremacy Clause calls for the preemption of any state
law that is contrary to a valid federal law, the Supremacy Clause does
not require that every state law that interferes with the accomplishment of a federal purpose be preempted. 136 In fact, the difficult part
of obstacle preemption analysis, as with impossibility analysis, is
determining how much interference is sufficient interference to render
the state law preempted.
Cases analyzing laws alleged to be obstacles to federal purposes
generally disclose a two-fold inquiry. 137 The first part of the inquiry
considers whether the federal purpose alleged to be obstructed by the
operation of state law is, indeed, a purpose of the federal law. 138
retains the power to decide whether to risk fetal hann.
us Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass' n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2383 (1992) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988);
Schneidewind v. ANRPipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Cotp., 464
U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Cotp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974); Perez v.
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971).
The difference between impossibility analysis and obstacle analysis is that obstacle analysis
pennits preemption of state law even where no actual violation of federal law is likely to occur, or
where the violator of the federal law will be someone other than the one upon whom the state
imposes its requirement. If the state law entails interference with some ultimate puipOse of the federal
law, but does not translate into an affirmative obligation to violate federal law, then obstacle
preemption is the appropriate approach. One writer has described obstacle preemption as a type of
preemption used by courts "when they can locate no other justification for preemption." Hoke, supra
note 63, at 750.
llf See CTS Cozp. v. Dynamics Cotp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 86 (1987) (holding state law allowing
delay in tender offers not preempted by state law).
137
For discussions of the federalism issues relevant to the inquiry, see Fernandez, supra note 65,
at 1241-42; Hoke, supra note 63, at 701-10; and Wiggins, supra note 67, at 24-30.
131
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 136-37 (1973).
Discerning the puipOse of the federal law can, of course, present difficulties in some cases. See
Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 111 S. Ct. 2476, 2487 (1991) (rejecting proffered puipOses
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Second, the inquiry turns to the frequently more irksome question of
whether the state law's operation obstructs the accomplishment of this
federal purpose enough to render the state law an "obstacle."139 In other
words, does the state law require behavior that precludes the achievement
of the federal goal or prohibit behavior necessary to its achievement? 140
In judicial decisions, obstacle analysis routinely follows upon a court's
conclusion that the relationship between the federal and state law does not
call for impossibility preemption.141 In such cases, the court may fmd
that, even though it is possible to comply with both laws, there is
something about compliance with the state law that will interfere with the
accomplishment of federal objectives distinct from the affirmative
obligations imposed by the federal law. Such sequential analysis is almost
certainly unnecessary in the Title VII/fetal tort context, however, because
in this context the court's rejection of impossibility preemption assures
rejection of obstacle preemption as well.
of the federal statute as "rest[ing] .on little more than snippets of legislative history and policy
speculations''); CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 97.99 {White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's
identification of the federal statute's goals for pwposes of obstacle analysis).
111
According to Professor Fernandez, if the state law does not make it impossible to achieve
the federal pwposes, then the court should gauge the extent to which the incidental effects of the
state law nevertheless "make ••• more difficult or ..• delay the achievement of the federal goal
••••" Fernandez, supra note 65, at 1248. For this category of cases, Professor Fernandez advocates
balancing the benefits to be achieved by the stated goals of the state statute against the degree of
hann to the federal regulatory scheme.. !d. One difficulty with this approach is that it may force
courts to make value·laden, legislative·like choices between substantive governmental interests. Id.
at 124849; cf. Riddle, supra note 104, at 689 (discussing subjective, judicial interpretation of federal
legislation in the context of preemption inquires). Courts might be able to achieve the goals
envisioned by Professor Fernandez by balancing the detriment to the federal scheme against the
detriment to the state interest, as is done in the conflict of laws situation. See Bernhard v. Harrah's
Club, 546 P.2d 719, 723 (Cal. 1976). This would be a more objective test that would not require
the court to measure the worth of the substantive values underlying the state law, but would instead
permit the court simply to assess the comparative impairment of presumptively valid state goals that
would result from a decision not to apply state law. See Naile, supra note 127, at 695 ("If the state
interest is strong and only the potential for conflict exists, the state regulation may stand.'') (citing
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973)); Lynch, supra note 61,
at 386. Responding to the problem of excessive judicial discretion resulting from his proposal,
Professor Fernandez argues that courts exercise such discretion every time they determine the
occupation of a field by federal legislation or define the goals of federal legislation. Fernandez,
supra note 65, at 1249.
140
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ofAmerica, the Supreme Court indicated that a state statute
interfering with the federal objective of avoiding delay in tender offers did not constitute a
preemptive obstacle where the statute did not make delay inevitable. 481 U.S. 69, 84 (1987).
141
See, e.g., id. at 79 ("Because it is entirely possible for entities to comply with both [federal
and state law], the state statute can be pre-empted only if it frustrates the purposes of the federal
law.''); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987) (applying obstacle
analysis after impossibility analysis).
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In the typical case that entails both impossibility and obstacle
analysis, the court's impossibility analysis focuses on the interference
with the affirmative obligations imposed by the federal law, whereas
the obstacle analysis focuses on a federal goal above and beyond
simply obtaining compliance with those obligations. In the Title
VII/fetal tort context, by contrast, proponents of preemption would
not be able to cite any federal objective different from the goal of
inclusion of women-precisely the goal already analyzed in the
impossibility query. In rejecting impossibility preemption, the court
will have rejected the contention that state law thwarts this objective.
The purpose of Title VII, as construed in Johnson Controls, 142
is to assure the inclusion of women in the workplace without regard
to their reproductive status. 143 If the pressure that fetal tort liability
imposes on employers to interfere with this federal purpose is
insufficient to effectuate impossibility preemption, then it is equally
insufficient to effectuate obstacle preemption. If it is possible for an
employer to bear the costs of fetal tort liability without succumbing
to the temptation to violate Title VII, then any threat to the purpose
of Title VII is far too attenuated to constitute an obstacle to the
accomplishment of that purpose. 144 The duty to reconcile the state
law with the federal law, moreover, should be especially strong in this
context. 145 State law imposing damages liability for fetal harm is an
exercise of the police power in an area of peculiarly local concem.146 The duty is further strengthened by the fact that Congress
has not, in the allegedly preemptive federal legislation, made any
provision for the need addressed by the state law. 147 Those injured
by these hazards certainly cannot tum to Title VII to seek recovery.

142

International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 1196, 1203 (1991).

10

Id.

144

See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
u But cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2632 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the proposition that federal law should be narrowly
construed).
1
" See Barnes v. Glen Theater, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (1991); supra note 61.
147
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Co., 464 U.S. 238, 252 (1984). Although it was argued above that
congressional intent is irrelevant to conflict analysis, see supra note 63, courts may have a special
duty to ~oncile where the absence of congresSional intent to preempt is clear, as it is here. If
Congress bad thought about tort liability when it enacted Title VII, it would not have intended to
pennit employers to escape liability, anymore than it intended to pennit them to escape liability
under state fair employment laws. Cf. H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939)
(finding a presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state safety regulation).
1
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Title VII thus is unlikely to preempt state fetal tort law .148
Employers concerned about tort liability resulting from workplace
fetal hazards must look elsewhere for an escape from the quandary.
If Title VII will not preempt employer liability for fetal harm, then,
absent legislation, employers will escape their quandary only if the
prospect of unavoidable tort liability can support a BFOQ defense for
employers excluding fertile women from the workplace in ostensible
violation of Title VII.149
·
III. THE BFOQ DEFENSE: CosT AS BUSINESS EssENCE150
If an employer cannot rely on the federal preemption doctrine to
avert fetal tort liability, then it may elect instead to exclude women
in apparent violation of Johnson Controls in the hope that some
remnant of the BFOQ defense remains intact for fetal protection
cases. Although the Johnson Controls Court rejected the altruistically
based BFOQ proffered in that case, it did not actually decide the issue
of whether the defense might by predicated upon the cost of tort
liability. In fact, the Court's holding suggests that the BFOQ may
operate where the cost of tort liability would be high.

A. Business Essence
To establish the BFOQ defense, the employer must show that
being a member of the favored sex (here males and infertile women)
is a qualification necessary to performance of an essential aspect of
••• It may be argued that employers doing all within their power to protect fetal health should
not bear financial responsibility for injuries they could not have averted. Parents who choose to risk
the health of their fetuses arguably should be responsible, whether in tort or otherwise, for the
results of their risk-taking. It would be difficult as a practical matter to move the burden from the
employer to the parents. If a pregnant or soon-to-be pregnant woman decides to stay in a hazardous
work environment, the employer may obtain a legally binding waiver of the woman's own right to
bring subsequent legal action against the employer for hann to her own health. The woman is
powerless, however, to waive the right of the fetus to sue in the future. See International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Cl 1196, 1211 (1991) (White, J., concurring). Employers
concerned about fetal tort liability may use the expedient of a contract providing that parents who
elect to undergo exposure despite warnings will indemnify the employer for fetal damage. Yet, many
workers do not possess the financial resources, including inSurance, that would pennit them to
indemnify employers for such tort liability. See Lawrence Postol et al., The Binh of Uncontrolled
Injury, RECORDER, May 23, 1991, at 4.
1
" See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
uo The term "costs" is used to include both affirmative expenditures and profit losses.
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the job. In order to make this showing, the employer must demonstrate:
(1) that the aspect of the job which women1s1 are unable to
perform is part of the "essence" of the defendant's business, rather
than something "peripheral to the central mission of the ... business, " 152 and
(2) that all or substantially all members of the excluded class are
incapable of performing the job, so that exclusion of the class is
necessary. 153 This "necessity'' requirement actually may have two
facets:
(a) exclusion of females, rather than some measure short of
exclusion, must be necessary; 154 and
(b) the defendant must have a factual basis for believing
either
(1) that virtually all women are incapable of performing
the job without sacrificing the goal, tss or

1

In the context of fetal protection, the women whose exclusion the employer seeks to justify
are the subcategocy of fertile women. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971)
(holding that discriminating against a subset of women and not a comparable subset of men
constitutes sex discrimination). The fact that only a subset of women is affected has no impact on
the analysis. See supra not.es 6, 42-43.
m Western Air Lines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985) (citing Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)); see Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971), cited with approval in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
321, 333 (1977); see also Torres v. Wisconsin Dep'tofHealth & Social Setvs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1528
(7th Cir. 1988) (first step in deciding applicability of BFOQ defense is understanding employer's
business), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989). The "essence"
requirement derives from the requirement in the statutocy language setting forth the BFOQ that the
qualification be necessacy to the particular business of the employer. See Brown, supra note 11, at
512. One writer has argued that courts have applied the "essence" test articu1ated in Diaz in two
different manners: (I) as a requirement that exclusion of one sex be necessaxy to the vecy essence of
the total business and (2) as a requirement that exclusion of one sex be necessacy to the essence of the
particu1ar job. Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1025, 1043· n.ll3 (1977). Another conunentator has noted that after
Dothard the courts have applied a hybrid test combining the two above tests. Befort, supra note 24,
at 13. The present Article assumes that the essence requirement focuses on the need to employ
members of a particu1ar sex in order to assure accomplishment of some aspect of the particu1ar job,
which is essential to the vecy functioning of the business.
'" See Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388.
154
See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, 730 F.2d 994, 1000-01 (5th Cir. 1984); Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), and cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1007 (1972); if. Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (D. Del. 1978)
(allowing sex discrimination based on the privacy rights of customers only if there is no way the
employer can selectively assign jobs to avoid conflicts). Professor Befort has suggested that this "no
reasonable, less discri~ry alternative" criterion applies only in cases where client safety and
privacy are at stake. Befort, supra note 24, at 16-17.
us Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969), cited in Dothard,
"
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(2) that some women are incapable of performing the
job without sacrificing the goal and there is no way to
distinguish between those women who could do the job and
those who could not. 156
The crux of the Johnson Controls debate on whether the BFOQ
defense should be available in fetal protection cases is the question of
what kinds of goals can qualify as business "essence" under the first
prong of the BFOQ analysis. 157

B. An Unresolved Issue
Part of the Johnson Controls holding is that fetal safety can never
be the essence ·of a manufacturing business. The employer's goal of

433 U.S. at 333. The BFOQ defense is most clearly implicated in situations where physical
differences between the sexes disqualify one sex and not the other from perfonning the task at hand.
Accordingly, the BFOQ would clearly be available to enable an employer in the business of
providing wet-nursing services to hire only women. See Rosenfeld v. Southern. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d
1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971). Under the analysis set forth in the text, wet nursing is the essence of the
business; that is, possession of breasts is necessary to wet nurse, so exclusion of males is necessaty
to achieve the goal, and virtually all men lack the qualification in question. The Civil Rights
Commission, established by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, bas also acknowledged that the BFOQ
defense is applicable where employment of members of a particular sex is necessary for authenticity,
e.g., a male or female acting role. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(aX2) (1992). Although courts have approved
application of the BFOQ defense beyond such biological difference and authenticity situations, the
BFOQ remains a very narrow defense. See Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333 (noting the "virtually uniform
view of the federal courts that [BFOQ defense] provides only the narrowest of exceptions''). But see
Sirota, supra note 152, at 1026 (arguing that "[t]he meager legislative history of the BFOQ provision
indicates that Congress intended it to have broad application in the area of sex discrimination'').
151
This standard bas emerged in cases where inclusion of the class at issue allegedly threatens
the safety of third persons. See Usery, 531 F.2d at 235-36; Weeks, 408 F.2d at 235 n.5; cf. Western
Airlines, 472 U.S. at 414-18 (adopting Weeks standard for age discrimination cases based on safety
considerations).
157
Recall that the employer's first task in proving this defense is to show that the task for which
women are not qualified is the "essence" of the business. There are three possible purposes that
employers could offer to justify their fetal protection policies as BFOQs. They might proffer fetal
protection as a goal unto itsel~ the way Johnson Controls did. See International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991). They might proffer the goal of saving costs
either by averting potential tort liability, or by avoiding the expense of accommodating the workplace
to women. Such acconunodation might include measures to shield women from excessive lead
exposure. Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit, in Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543
{11th Cir. 1984), was willing to recognize fetal health as a proper foundation for the business
necessity defense, but was unwilling to recognize the cost of such prospective tort liability as such
a foundation. !d. at 1553 n.15. Employers might also proffer good public relations goals as a reason
for not wanting to endanger fetuses. See Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 905 (Posner, J., dissenting).
In addition to failing the essence requirement, Johnson Controls' policy also failed the BFOQ
requirement that all or substantially all women be disqualified. International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, 111 S. CL 1196, 1208 (1991). Johnson Controls' plan excluded all women within a given
age group who did not supply medical documentation of their infertility, regardless of the women's
procreative plans. !d. at 1200.
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protecting future generations, then, cannot support a BFOQ to defend
a sex-specific fetal protection plan. 158 Five justices joined in this
portion of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion. 159
In concluding that fetal safety is not the essence of the business,
however, Justice Blackmon's opinion ventured beyond the narrow fetal
safety defense that Johnson Controls had offered. Justice Blackmun
additionally answered the broader question of what, besides the
rejected fetal safety factor, will qualifY as business essence for
purposes of the BFOQ. In particular, Justice Blackmun rejected the
idea that defendants could rely on the costs of tort liability as a
foundation for the BFOQ in fetal protection cases. 160 He argued that
the Supreme Court a,nd Congress had already rejected costs-savings
as a ground for pregnancy-related exclusion of women. 161 Justice
Blackmun read in the statutory language of Title VII congressional
intent to limit availability of the defense to situations where the
151

The five-justice majority, joined by Justice Scalia for purposes of this issue, ruled that the
simple, altruistic goal of fetal protection (the rationale actually offered by the defendant in the case),
was not the essence of the business. ~ Ill S. Ct. at 1207; id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). In
fact, Johnson Controls' expressed pwpose for the policy was "protecting pregnant women and their
unborn children from dangerous blood lead levels.'' 886 F.2d at 876. According to Justice Blackmun's
opinion for the majority, "[d]ecisions about the welfare of future children nrust be left to the parents
who conceive, bear, support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire those parents.''
Ill S. Ct. at 1207. This rationale of the holding should extend to prohibit policies that exclude
pregnant women, as well as to those that exclude all fertile women. But see Johnson Controls, 886
F.2d at 898 (holding that Johnson Controls' policy constituted a BFOQ); id. at 904 (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that employer's business essence encompasses the ethical and legal concerns
of the employer).
m Justice White argued in a concurrence joined by two other justices, that a fetal-safety based
BFOQ defense could conceivably be available to Johnson Controls, but that the record before the
Court was too sparse to tell. 111 S. Ct. at 1212-15 (White, J., concurring).
'"' Id. at 1208-09.
11
' Id. at 1209 (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18
& n.32 (1978) and Arizona Governing Comm'n v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1080 (1983)); see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1988). In fact, Justice Blackmun took the position that
the BFOQ should never be available to defend fetal protection policies, regardless of what puxpose
the employer articulates. ll1 S. Ct. at 1207-09. For Justice Blackmun, the first prong of the BFOQ
defense uses the tenn "essence" to mean only the production of and profit from the product, and not
additional prefatozy goals such as preserving fetal health or otherwise making the world a better
place. !d. at 1205-06. In the wake of Johnson Controls, "only when an employer has pointed to a
specific, legitimate safety responsibility necessarily assumed by the employer that is not generally
shared by evezy other person in the workforce has the narrow 'safety BFOQ'been met.'' Brown, supra
note 11, at 515. In so ruling, the Court confined the safety justification that had been recognized as
supporting the BFOQ to situations where the individuals whose safety was threatened were
"customers [or] third parties whose safety is essential to the business of battezy manufacturing."
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206. On the question of cost-based BFOQs, by contrast, Justice
Blaclanun did note at the end of his opinion that costs so steep that they threaten to ruin the
employer might qualify as business essence. Id. at 1208-09; see infra note 163, 174-95 and
accompanying text.
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excluded women were literally unable to perform the rudimentary
functions of the job, regardless of cost considerations. 162 At the same
time that he pronounced the irrelevance of cost factors, however,
Justice Blackinun also acknowledged that cost justifications, particularly those involving ruinous costs, were not before the Court, so
required no ruling in any event. 163
Justices White and Scalia, by contrast, predicted in separate
concurrences that there would be cases in which the BFOQ would
justify fetal protection policies. 164 These justices believed that cost
justifications, whether based on potential fetal tort liability or on the
expense of transforming the workplace to accommodate women, could
constitute business essence for BFOQ purposes!65 The Johnson
m "[M]ost telling," in Justice Blackmun's view, was the statutocy term "occupational," which
"indicates that ••• [the employer's] requirements must concern job-related skills and aptitudes." 111
S. Ct. at 1204. Justice Blackmun argued that, "[b]y modifying 'qualification' with 'occupational,'
Congress natrowed the term to qualifications that affect an employee' s ability to do the job." Id. at
1205. Although Justice White suggested that no court had ever similarly relied upon the
"occupational" language, id. at 1210 n.1 (White, J., concurring), it would seem that the first two
prongs of the BFOQ analysis derive, in part, from this language.
10
Id. at 1208-09; see id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (finding the issue not resolved).
Although the majority opinion contains language rejecting cost considerations as an adequate
rationale for the BFOQ defense, Justice Blackmun arguably limited the Court's holding to situations
where the rationale offered in defense of the policy was the goal of protecting fetuses, as opposed
to the goal of protecting finances. In addition, he noted that "costs •.. so prohibitive as to threaten
the survival of the employer's business" were not before the Court. Id. at 1209; see infra notes 17495 and accompanying text (discussing ruinous costs).
Although the issue of cost justification was not before the Court, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Conunission (''EEOC'') and commentators have suggested that the case decided that cost
justifications cannot support a BFOQ defense. See, e.g., EEOC: Policy Guidance on the Supreme
Court's Johnson Controls Decision, 8 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 405:6941, 6943 (June 28, 1991); Postol
& Adelman, supra note 10, at 37. But see Marcia Coyle, Fetal-ProtecJion Ruling Buoys Rights
Groups, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 1, 1991, at 5 (suggesting that Johnson Controls left open the natrow
possibility of a cost-based BFOQ for fetal protection plans).
1
" 111 S. Ct. at 1210 {White, J., concurring); id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). With regard to
the scope of the BFOQ defense, Justice White wrote that showing that a policy is "'reasonably
necessary' to the 'normal operation' of making batteries, which is Johnson Controls' 'particular
business,"' would be difficult, but not impossible. Id. at 1210 {White, J., concurring). Along with the
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, Justice White joined with the majority in reversing the affirmance
of sununaxy judgment, but only because he believed that the Johnson Controls' policy was ovetbroad
and because there remained factual issues about whether the Johnson Controls' policy comported with
the elements of the BFOQ defense. Id. at 1210, 1214-15 (White, J., concurring). Facts remaining in
dispute were: whether the employer demanded a risk-avoidance level for fetuses substantially higher
than risk levels tolerated for others, such as employees and consumers; whether the risks of fetal
harm or associated costs had substantially increased to justify the employer's decision to adopt a
broader policy than it had earlier used; and whether harm caused to offspring by lead exposure in
females was sufficiently in excess of that caused by exposure of males to warrant exclusion of only
women. Id. at 1215 (White, J., concurring).
11
' As indicated above, the two disagreed on whether the goal of protecting future generations,
standing alone, could support the BFOQ defense. On this issue, Justice Scalia a~eed with the
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Controls Corporation, Justice Scalia remarked, simply had not
presented such rationales. 166
The Supreme Court's stance in Johnson Controls leaves some
doubt about whether the cost-based BFOQ defense can ever save a
fetal protection plan. Lower courts may feel bound by Justice
Blackmun's pr.onouncements on the cost BFOQ issue} 67 His statements can arguably be characterized as part of a very broad holding
in the case: that sex-specific fetal protection plans are absolutely
unlawful without exception. 168 It appears, moreover, that Justice
White, who disagreed with Justice Blackmun on the question, viewed
the holding ofJohnson Controls broadly enough to encompass Justice
Blackmun's rejection of the cost justification defense. 169
Although the cost justification language has been and will be cited
as part of the Court's holding, there is good reason to consider it
dicta. Justice Blackmun qualified his statements with the caveat that
"Johnson Controls has not argued that it faced any costs from tort
liability."170 In addition to Justice Blackmun's own statements of

majority that the employer's interest in fetal health, standing alone, could not support the BFOQ. I d.
at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Thus, for Justice Scalia, as for Justice Blacknnm, the question of fetal
safety was a question for parents, not employers, to answer. Justice White believed that fetal
protection interests, alone, could support a BFOQ defense, but that Johnson Controls had not shown
evidence of substantial fetal health risks. Id. at 1214-15 (White, J., concurring).
1
" I d. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (noting Johnson Controls' failure to
argue that the costs from tort liability or transfonning the workplace for safety reasons were
prohibitive), rev'd, 111 S. Ct 1196 (1991). Justice Scalia apparently had additional, unexpressed
resexvations about the majority's opinion. See 111 S. Cl at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
161
See Befort, supra note 24, at 53 ("[T]he potential for a future return to . . • expansionaxy
viewpoints [on BFOQ] should not be dismissed entirely..•. [T]he majority's narrow construction
won the support of only five justices [, and] [t]he appointment of a more consexvative jurist than
Justice Souter ••• may well have led to a vexy different formulation of the BFOQ test."); Coyle,
supra note 163, at 5 (suggesting that Johnson Controls left open the narrow possibility of cost BFOQ
for fetal protection plans). Subsequent lower court decisions that have cited Johnson Controls in
connection with the BFOQ have pertained to privacy and religion, rather than cost justifications. See
Hernandez v. University of St Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214, 216-17 (D. Minn. 1992) (privacy);
Jennings v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 786 F. Supp. 376, 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y.)
(privacy), aff'd, 977 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1992); EEOC v. Kamehameba Schools/Bishop Estate, 780 F.
Supp. 1317, 1320, 1322 (D. Haw. 1991) (religion). It remains uncertain how the lower courts will
read the cost BFOQ language.
1
ca Even so, if employers face significant enough fetal tort liability, they may elect to take their
chances, opting for exclusionaxy fetal protection measures despite the odds that lower courts will
prohibit use of a cost-based BFOQ. See Louise Van Dyck, Comment, The Costs ofFetal Protection,
23 CoNN. L. REv. 1049, 1052-53 (1991) (discussing potential for heavy tort liability).
119
See 111 S. Ct at 1210 (White, J., concurring) {referring to the majority's "[erroneous holding]
that the BFOQ defense is so narrow that it could never justify a sex-specific fetal protection policy'').
1
" Id. at 1209; see id. at 1210·14 (White, J., concurring). In addressing the cost justification issue,
Justice Blacknnm cautioned no fewer than three times that "the issue is not before us," "Johnson
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limitation, Justice Scalia's concurrence, after arguing that costs would
support a BFOQ, cautioned that "[i]n the present case, . . . Johnson
Controls has not asserted a cost-based BFOQ." 171 These caveats
make inroads on the majority's ostensibly unequivocal statement that
fetal protection policies are absolutely banned by Title VII. To the
extent that the majority's statements are not part of the Court's
holding, but simply indicators of how the Court would decide the
question if it were presented, then the statements are probably not
very good indicators of what decision the Court would reach today.
The four concurring justices who believed emphatically that costs can
support a BFOQ remain on the Court, 172 whereas Justice Marshall,
who joined in the five-justice majority opinion that rejected cost
factors, has relinquished his seat to Justice Thomas. In the event that
another such fetal protection policy reaches the Supreme Court, the
Court has left itself a wide enough berth to uphold the BFOQ defense
in future cases. 173

C. Ruinous Costs
As a general rule, employers cannot escape Title VII liability by
proving that discrimination would be economically expedient. 174

Controls bas not argued that it faced any costs from tort liability," and "[w]e, of course, are not
presented with, nor do we decide, a case in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the
survival ofthe employer's business." !d. at 1208, 1209. Although two of these cautions were made
more in connection with predictions about preemption than about cost justification BFOQs, the third
was in connection with "prohibitive," survival-threatening costs. Id. at 1209.
m Id. at 1217 (Scalia, J., concurring).
m The four concurring justices were Scalia, White, Rehnquist, and Kennedy.
m See Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting that result may
be different in a case with different facts); cf. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S.
272, 296 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that when "it is entirely clear that an issue of law is
not presented by the facts of the case, it is beyond [the Court's]jurisdiction to reach it''). Writers have
recognized this potential loophole. See Befort, supra note 24, at 53 (recognizing potential for broader
BFOQ than that described in Johnson Controls decision); Coyle, supra note 163, at 5 (recognizing
that Johnson Controls left open the possibility of cost BFOQ for fetal protection plans). Understandably, employers may be reluctant to risk violating what is arguably a Supreme Court rule, but there
may be cases in which deliberate violation of Title VII as construed by the Supreme Court is
regarded as the lesser of two evils. See infra notes 174-95 and accompanying text.
,,. See Smallwood v. United Air Lines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1007 (1982). Title VII contains an "anti-cost bias," that generally precludes reliance on cost factors
to defend discrimination. Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost ofOlder Workers, Disparate Impact, and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L. REv. 229, 240-46 (1990). In the BFOQ
context, this anti-cost bias often results in courts' limiting the defense's reach to those situations in
which a person's sex actually thwarts the individual's actual ability to perfonn the functions of a
particular job. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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"[R]emedying inequality normally costs money." 175 The BFOQ can
defend fetal protection policies only if employers overcome this anti-cost
bias and convince the trier of fact that cost factors should, in this context,
qualify as business essence for purposes of BFOQ analysis. 176 The
controversy that surrounds the cost-BFOQ question makes predictions
tenuous. 177 Nevertheless, it is probably safe to conclude that there is a
category of cases in which the BFOQ defense can be predicated upon
cost factors. 178 The more difficult question concerns the breadth of that
category.
There is some consensus that Hruinous" costs support the BFOQ
defense.179 When the Johnson Controls majority argued that costs
should not support the BFOQ, it expressly reserved the ruinous costs
issue: "We, of course, are not presented with, nor do we decide, a case
in which costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the
employer's business. We merely reiterate our prior holdings that the
incremental cost of hiring women cannot justify discrimination against
them."18° Costs are "ruinous" if they are so steep that they threaten to

1
" Sirota, supra note 152, at 1054 (quoting EEOC Decision No. 72-1292, 4 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cases (BNA) 845, 851 (1972)). But cf. New York City Transit Autb. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 567, 587,
590 n.33 (1979) (holding, in an impact case, that a business necessity was established where no other
inexpensive method of identifying those qualified for the positions); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84-85 (1977) (holding an employer need not acconunodate employee's
religious beliefs if accommodation would result in substantial costs to employer).
m Even if employers can make this showing, they need to make the further showing under the
second prong of the BFOQ that avoidance of such costs can be achieved only by excluding all fertile
women, all pregnant women, or whatever class of women it is that the particular policy excludes. See
Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985) (citing Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969)); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388-89 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
177
Compare Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1204-07 (suggesting no cost BFOQ) with id. at
1211-12 (White, J., concurring) ("[BFOQ] defense is broad enough to include considerations of cost")
and id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concuning) (suggesting costs may support a BFOQ defense).
111
See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
m See Johnson Controls, 111 S.Ct. at 1209; Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388; see also International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 905 (Posner, J., dissenting) (envisioning a broad
intetpretation of business essence that would encompass prohibitive costs); cf. Arizona Governing
Conun. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1098-99 (1983) (Powell, J., dissenting) (suggesting prohibitive costs
may justify discrimination); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (permitting defense of ruinous costs in OSHA context); Brodin, supra note 25, at
358. (advocating against cost justifications in impact cases except where "the very financial existence
of the enterprise is at stake"). But cf. Sirota, supra note 152, at 1052 n.164 (arguing against
prohibitive cost BFOQs because an employer would not be able to prove that hiring both sexes
caused business to fail and also because allowing ruinous cost BFOQs would prohibit discrimination
by financially sue~ businesses, but not by marginal businesses).
•m 111 S. Ct. at 1209. The concurring justices argued that the facts before the Court did not
present any question of costs, whether ruinous or non-ruinous, and that the Court'sprecedents did not
resolve the question of whether cost factors can support the BFOQ. Id. at 1210-14 (White, J.,
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destroy the employer's business. 181 If the exclusion of some category of
employees is so important to the business that the costs of including those
employees will put the employer out of business, then avoiding those
costs is part of the essence of the business. 182 Thus, in the fetal tort
liability context, infertility among women183 would be a permissible job
qualification for purposes of the BFOQ defense if potential fetal tort
liability costs were heavy enough to threaten the viability of the
business. 184
Although Supreme Court views on ruinous costs as a BFOQ are
limited primarily to the passing dicta in Johnson Controls, 185 two lower
court decisions tend to confirm that costs severe enough to threaten the
viability of a business can support the BFOQ defense. 186 In Diaz v. Pan

concurring); id. at 1216-17 (Scalia, J., concurring).
m The detriment inquiry here is necessarily more hypothetical than it was in the preemption
context. Preemption analysis focused on the degree to which state law intetfered with federal
requirements or objectives overall. The focus was on federalism, whereas in BFOQ analysis, the focus
is on the viability of the individual defendant. The concreteness that preemption analysis required was
some showing that these kinds of cases have resulted in violations of federal laws or purposes, not
a showing that the individual defendant has violated the federal law. BFOQ analysis, by contrast,
measures the extent of detriment the individual employer must experience in order to be able to
invoke that detriment to support a BFOQ defense. Given that this narrow defense is available only
if the individual employer meets its requirements, not where employers in the defendant's class tend
to meet them, the courts should accept threatened, rather than actual detriment. Concrete evidence
of the scope of detriment to this defendant would be evidence that the employ~ has already gone
out of business.
111
See Dkrz, 442 F.2d at 388; Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 299-300 (N.D.
Tex. 1981). The argument in the text admittedly ignores the first prong of the BFOQ defense, whic:h
requires the defendant to show that women are incapable ·of petfonning some aspect of the job.
Perhaps courts would rephrase this prong to require that women be incapable of doing the job
without ruinous costs being imposed, much as certain safety-BFOQ and privacy-BFOQ cases
incorporate safety and privacy into the essence of the business. See, e.g., Western Airlines v.
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 420-21 (1985).
113
Under the "sex plus" doctrine and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, discrimination against
only that subset of women who are fertile is nevertheless discrimination against women. See supra
notes 6, 42-43.
1
u See Carol Docan, Risk and Responsibility: The Working Woman Mak£s the Choice, Not the
Employer, 38 MEn. TRIAL TECH. Q. 145, 152 (1991) (suggesting that if employers are held strictly
liable and that threatens survival of business, BFOQ may apply).
115
111 S. Ct. 1196, 1209 (1991). Cases in the usually analogous area of age discrimination do
not offer much assistance on the cost justification issue. Although cases under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA''), Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1990)), tend to reject costs as supportive of the ADEA
defenses, costs play a special role in the ADEA context. ADEA places particular emphasis on
foibidding employers to impose on aging employees the costs of increased wages, pension benefits,
and insurance that accompany a worker•s aging. See Terrence P. Collingsworth, Note, The Cost
Defense Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 580, 581.
1
" See also Smallwood v. United Airlines, 661 F.2d 303, 307 (4th Cir. 1981), cen. denied, 456
U.S. 1007 (1982) (arguing that only ruinous costs should support the BFOQ defense).
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American Ailways,181 the Fifth Circuit rejected profit loss as a foundation for BFOQ and suggested that the financial costs of complying with
Title VII could support a BFOQ only if such costs actually kept the
employer frqm "perfonn[ing] the primary function or service it offers."188 If a cost will keep the employer from doing what it is in
business to do, then that cost undennines the essence of the business.
Ruinous costs clearly render nonnal operationS impossible and meet the
BFOQ requirement.
Similarly, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 189 the district court recognized that hiring males as flight attendants would harm the defendant's
image as the "love airline" and would diminish profits accordingly.190
Nonetheless, the court held that the BFOQ is not available merely
because the business "goal" of making a profit would be thwarted if men
were employed.191 The court explained that the defense would be
available, however, where accomplishment of the very tasks that the
employer is in business to perfonn would be thwarted. 192 If forcing a
business to hire women has the direct result that the business will be
entirely ruined, then the business essence must be defined to require the
tasks for which women are deemed unsuitable. 193
The more difficult question is whether costs that do not threaten
extinction for the employer may support a BFOQ defense.194 Discussing

11

492 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
'" Id. at 389.
'" 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
•~ Id. at 296, 302 n.25; see Smallwood, 661 F.2d at 307; Usezy v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531
F.2d 224, 235 n.26 (5th Cir. 1976); cf. Johnson v. Pike Corp., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (C.D. Cal.
1971) (stating that a cost justification cannot support business necessity defense).
"' Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 302 n.25.
uz Id. at 302-03 (citing Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases 1162, 1163-64
(C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981)). The airline alleged that female flight
attendants' function of being sexually alluring to male passengers was a crucial component of the
airline's success. Although the court recognized that the airline's growth and prosperity depended in
large part on the attractive attendants who created a ..love airlines" image, the court ruled that
transporting passengers, rather than sexual allurement, constituted the essence ofthe airline's business.
ld. at 302. If, however, the airline could have shown that most passengers would have switched to
a different airline if the alluring attendants had been removed, and that this would have destroyed the
business or posed a serious threat to continued operations, this showing likely would have been
enough to demonstrate that the essence of the business was sexual allurement, rather than transport.
It would have been the allurement, not simple transportation, that people had been paying for, as
evidenced by the fact that they stopped paying when the allurement ended.
113
Wilson exemplified a willingness on the part of courts to decide for themselves what the
defendant's business is. See 511 F. Supp. at 302. Courts confronted with the prospect of a ruined
business should perhaps be more ready to accept the defendant's definition of the essence of the
business.
'" One writer has suggested that cost factors necessarily come into play under the second prong
of the BFOQ, where the employer may prevail by showing that it is '"impractical to deal with women
'
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the question as a hypothetical matter in Johnson Controls, the justices
exhibited disagreement. 195 The two prior Supreme Court cases relied
upon in Johnson Controls, moreover, do not necessarily support either
position.

D. Dothard and Manhart
In Johnson Controls, the justices debated the availability of a cost
justification defense that the defendant never raised. 196 Justice Blackmun
cited Los Angeles v. Manharf 97 for the proposition that anticipated costs
short of extinction of the business cannot support a BFOQ defense. 198
Justice White relied on Dothard v. Rawlinson 199 to support the position
that cost justifications may provide a proper foundation for the BFOQ
defense.200
Manhart challenged an employer's requirement that women contribute
more to a pension plan than men.201 The employer defended the resulting disparity in take-home pay with the argument that women would
ultimately live longer, and, therefore, cost the plan more in benefits.202
The Court accepted the truth of the proposition that "[w]omen as a class,
do live longer than men," and would receive more benefits than men, as
a group, would receive.203 Despite this cost justification, the Manhart
Court concluded that the premium disparity constituted sex discrimination
in violation of Title VII. Manhart, however, was not a BFOQ case.
Rather, the case concerned whether the plaintiff had made a prima facie
case of sex discrimination.204
on an individual basis."' See Brodin, supra note 25, at 331 (quoting Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. &
Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 n.S (5th Cir. 1969)).
1
" See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text. A good educational program in the workplace
may avert ruinous tort liability costs in many cases. See Van Dyck, supra note 168, at 1083-86
(advocating non-preemption decision on the Title VII/fetal tort issue in order to encourage employers
to implement greater safety mechanisms in the workplace).
"' The major portion of the Court's BFOQ analysis went to rejecting the safety BFOQ that
Johnson Controls had offered. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 111 S. Ct 1196,
1204-08 (1991). The Court rejected the safety BFOQ because fetal safety is not an essential element
of battery manufacture. !d. at 1206.
1
., Los Angeles Dept of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
"'·Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct at 1209 (citing Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-18, 717 n.32).
Itt Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
200
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1212 {White, J., concurring) (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 33536).
201
Manhart, 435 U.S. at 704.
202
Id. at 706.
20, ld. at 707-08.
204
Id. at 716-17 nn.31-32; see Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1211 (White, J., concurring). But
see Brodin, supra note 25, at 326 & n.47 (citing CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., FEDERAL
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Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun's reliance on Manhart for his
prediction in Johnson Controls that cost factors would not support the
BFOQ defense was not unreasonable. Justice Stevens's opinion for the
Court in Manhart does venture from the narrow question before the Court
of whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case to the broader
question of cost as a defense generally under Title VII.205 Specifically,
in response to the Manhart petitioner's argument that cost considerations
had rebutted the prima facie case, Justice Stevens explained that cost
arguments could have helped the petitioner only if Title VII had an
affirmative defense for cost justifications.206 The Manhart opinion's
dismissal of the petitioner's argument on the ground that Title VII
contains no "cost justification" defense does not necessarily mean that
cost must be irrelevant to the available, but far narrower, BFOQ defense.
Even though the Manhart case is arguably relevant to the BFOQ scenario,
then, it is also easily distinguishable should the Court choose to
distinguish it when the issue comes before it,2°7
In his Johnson Controls concurrence, Justice White relied on Dothard
v. Rawlinson 208 for the proposition that costs may support a BFOQ defense. 209 In Dothard, the Supreme Court held that the Alabama prison
system could rely on the BFOQ defense to justify its exclusion of women
from positions that entailed contact with inmates.210 The Dothard Court
found that "[a] woman's relative ability to maintain order in a male,
maximum-security, unclassified penitentiaty of the type Alabama [then
ran] could be directly reduced by her womanhood."211 Relying on
Dothard, Justice White's Johnson Controls concurrence argued that "[i]f
the cost of employing women could not be considered, the [state of
Alabama in Dothardj should have been required to hire more staff and
restructure the prison environment rather than exclude women."212
Although Justice White's reliance on Dothard to support a general
cost BFOQ is reasonable, Dothard is entirely consistent with the narrower
view that only costs so severe as to destroy the defendant support a
BFOQ. While it is true that Dothard recognized a BFOQ where
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rejected cost as a defense, rather than as a rebuttal to prima facie case of disc:rimination).

See Manhart, 435 U.S. at 716-17.
Id. at 716.
2lll But see Kaminshine, supra note 174, at 245-46.
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433 u.s. 321 (1977}.
209
Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1212-13 (citing Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335-36).
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433 U.S. at 337.
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Id. at 335.
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Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1213.
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expenditure of money might eventually have eliminated the conditions
requiring exclusion of women, the costs of those improvements would
have been ruinous. In fact, a federal district court had already ordered the
state of Alabama to rectifY the prison situation, and the state had been
unable financially to make the improvements.213 The Dothard decision
supports a cost-based BFOQ, but only of the type where requiring
admission of women would have the effect of putting the defendant out
of business.
E. Breadth of the Cost BFOQ

Despite language in Dothard, Manhart, and Johnson Controls, the
Supreme Court has yet to decide whether costs can support a BFOQ. It
appears likely that ruinous costs will support such a defense. It remains
entirely uncertain, and may ultimately depend on the composition of the
Court, whether costs short of ruinous costs can form a valid foundation
for the BFOQ defense. The prospect that non-ruinous costs may be
capable of supporting the BFOQ defense raises the specter that Title VII
will become a scheme more protective of employer interests than of the
employee interests it was enacted to safeguard214 Another problem is
one of line-drawing: if non-ruinous costs support the BFOQ, how close
to ruinous must those costs come in order to support a BFOQ?215
The answer to the question of whether non-ruinous cost can and
should support a BFOQ turns on what balance is struck between
employer interests and the public interest in employment equality. This
balance is, of course, already broadly sketched in the dictates of Title VII.
The public interest outweighs employer interests in profits to the extent
that Title VII may be deemed to have an anti-cost basis. On the other
hand, by making the BFOQ defense available, Congress has tilted the
balance in favor of employer interests.

m See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977).
214
Both sides of the dispute have strong economic interests at stake. The employee has an
economic interest in gainful employment, the employer in keeping costs down. Arguably, both sides
face economic ruination. If the balance is struck in favor of the employer, then the employee faces
unemployment, which may constitute economic demise for the individual. CJ. Los Angeles Dep't of
Water & Health v. Manhart. 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978) (stating the policy behind Title VII focuses
on fairness to the individual).
215
If non-ruinous costs can support the BFOQ defense, the problem of line-drawing must be
addressed. How close to ruinous must the costs be in order to support the defense? If hiring women
would be so expensive that the employer would have to close down one entire plant, for example,
would that be a sufficient cost to support the BFOQ?
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In including the BFOQ in Title VII, Congress clearly showed concern
that businesses be permitted to continue to accomplish their essential
objectives, to remain viable, despite the strictures of Title VII. The
BFOQ, as usually applied, thus permits the employer to exclude those
whose sex precludes their performing tasks essential to the employer's
business. In cases recognizing the potential for a ruinous cost BFOQ,
courts would permit invocation of the BFOQ defense anytime forcing an
employer to employ an individual (or category of individuals) would
potentially destroy the business, even though the excluded workers are
capable of performing the specifics of the job they seek to fill. If they are
capable of performing the job, but their inclusion in the work force
threatens the continued existence of the business, then the BFOQ essence
requirement is met and the defense is available. The reason the BFOQ
would be available where specific job performance is possible, but
employment of the individual would otherwise ruin the business, is that
any factor so important that it can ruin the business must be deemed
"essence."
The BFOQ itself, of course, has no ruination qualification. The
defense is available when the business purposes will be thwarted or at
least not furthered by employment of the worker in question. Although
threat of ruination is not a prerequisite to the defense when worker
performance of the assigned tasks is at issue, it should be a prerequisite
when employers use the defense to excuse exclusion of people who can
do the work, but whose inclusion harms the employer financially. To do
otherwise would wander too far from the narrow defense created by
Congress.
As suggested above, it was only by inference that the Court in
Johnson Controls could conclude that a threat to fmancial viability
permits invocation of the BFOQ. This was a reasonable inference given
that the BFOQ "essence" requirement demonstrates that the congressional
concern underlying the BFOQ defense is business viability. Although the
Court's extrapolation from this defense to permit exclusion of anyone who
threatens business viability makes sense, it is merely an extrapolation and
therefore should be taken no farther than can be supported by the
rationale for the BFOQ that Congress created. To permit use of the
defense in situations where the harm threatened to the business falls short
of ruination would be unfaithful to the congressional intent as manifested
in the essence requirement.
When achievement of the public interest in equality can be accomplished only at the expense of the employer's viability, then employer
interests must win. In the fetal tort context, the ruinous cost BFOQ
should be permitted only if the employer can convince the trier of fact by
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a preponderance of the evidence that the prospect of tort liability is so
certain and so large that, in the wake of such liability, the business could
no longer function. Such a showing should entail evidence that ruinous
tort liability is more than a mere hypothetical possibility, but is instead
a concrete likelihood. To draw the line anywhere short of a showing of
concrete likelihood of ruin would sacrifice the public interest in employment equality for mere business profits, rather than actual business
viability.
Consider the problem that remains at the Johnson Controls plant.
Assume that Johnson Controls stands to lose substantial profits in the way
of tort damages for fetal harm because Title VII does not preempt fetal
tort law, and that Johnson Controls cannot rely on the BFOQ defense to
exclude women to avert that liability because the costs are not ruinous.
This could mean that Johnson Controls will now face tort liability for
fetal harm and that Johnson Controls shareholders will enjoy lower profits
because of that liability. It could also mean that Johnson Controls will act
in such a way as to enhance profits. This may include installing
protective equipment to make the workplace safer than had previously
been understood as possible, providing better warnings and education to
employees, providing at-risk female employees with truly comparable
positions in less hazardous areas of the business, and other safeguards.
CONCLUSION

In the aftermath of the Johnson Controls decision, employers face an
unappealing choice between violating state law and violating federal law.
Employers that admit fertile women to the workplace in compliance with
Johnson Controls face potential state tort liability for fetal harm. In these
tort suits, employers will seek to avoid liability by arguing that the
federal law announced in Johnson Controls preempts the state fetal tort
law. Employers that retain fetal protection policies, on the other hand,
face the prospect of employment discrimination suits by the excluded
women. The question for these employers will be whether they can avoid
Title VII liability by presenting a BFOQ defense predicated on the
argument that the fetal protection plan is necessary to protect the
employer from ruinous (or near ruinous) fetal tort liability.
Despite the Johnson Controls dicta on the preemption question, Title
VII will not necessarily preempt the fetal tort liability of employers that
include fertile women in the hazardous workplace. Particularly when there
is no evidence that the tort laws are effectively causing employers to
violate Title VII, the tort laws do not present a conflict with the federal
law that would warrant preemption. Therefore, employers facing the fetal
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hazard quandary may not have access to the preemption escape route held
forth by the Johnson Controls majority.
The BFOQ as an escape device may hold more promise than the
Johnson Controls majority suggested The justices ruled unanimously
only that employers cannot predicate the BFOQ defense on altruistic
interests in fetal health. Despite the majority's language rejecting a cost
BFOQ, the opinions actually implied that the justices would unanimously
agree to allow ruinous costs to support the BFOQ defense. They
discussed when, if ever, costs short of ruinous costs can defend a fetal
protection plan but did not decide the question since it was not presented
by the facts of the case. Hence, there should be some group of fetal
protection cases for which the cost BFOQ is available, but how far that
group may extend beyond cases of ruinous costs remains Wlclear.
· In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court discussed two escape routes
from the employer's fetal hazard quandary. Although the Johnson
Controls majority predicted that preemption held more promise than the
BFOQ, there will be cases in which the opposite is true. Some employers
may fare better if they violate Title VII and invoke the BFOQ than if
they violate state law and invoke the federal preemption doctrine.

